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LITIGATING NONIONIZING RADIATION 
INJURY CLAIMS: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
TO A CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM 
Pamela J. Laquidara * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each day, American industry mass-produces countless devices 
designed to make homelife more enjoyable and the workplace more 
efficient. However beneficial these technological achievements may 
be, they are, unfortunately, often accompanied by unexpected health 
and safety hazards. 1 One such technological product area consists of 
devices which utilize nonionizing radiation. 2 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, American industry and 
military research have developed many devices which, in the course 
of operation, emit nonionizing radiation.3 Today, these products per-
form a number of important functions in our lives, ranging from 
radar guidance for airplanes to microwave cooking. Although in-
creasing numbers of Americans are exposed to nonionizing radiation 
at home, in the workplace, and outdoors,4 scientists have only 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. Automobiles, for example, have transformed America into a mobile society, but only at 
the expense of hundreds of thousands of lives. Also, many new wonder drugs, while producing 
numerous benefits, have been found to induce dangerous, sometimes fatal, side effects. 
2. Nonionizing radiation is radiation with insufficient energy to cause atoms and molecules 
to ionize. For a detailed discussion of the nature and common sources of nonionizing radiation 
see infra Sections II.A. & B., text and notes at notes 15-52. 
3. See Massey, The Challenge of Nonionizing Radiation: A Proposal for Legislation, 105 
DUKE L.J. 105, 110-114 (1979). 
4. Research on Health Effects of Nonionizing Radiation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Natural Resources & Env't of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Chairman Jerome Ambro) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings]. 
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recently begun to research the biological effects of exposure to 
nonionizing radiation.5 There are indications that exposure to non-
ionizing radiation may produce harmful effects ranging from 
cataracts to genetic defects.6 The results of much of the research, 
however, are as yet surrounded by uncertainty and much controver-
sy.7 
Recently, the controversy surrounding the effects of nonionizing 
radiation has also found its way to the courts. A number of suits have 
been brought by plaintiffs who allege injury resulting from exposure 
to nonionizing radiation.8 The majority of the suits seek compensa-
tion from employers for workplace injuries, or from manufacturers 
of products which emit nonionizing radiation.9 Presently, no com-
prehensive legislation specifically provides a cause of action for in-
jury caused by exposure to nonionizing radiation.10 Therefore, plain-
tiffs who seek compensation for nonionizing radiation injury must 
proceed under existing workers' compensation schemesll and under 
common law tort theories.12 
Very few of the nonionizing radiation suits have been finally 
resolved;lS consequently, the success of the nonionizing radiation 
plaintiff remains an open question. The purpose of this article is to 
examine the present status of the nonionizing radiation plaintiff with 
the intent of assisting the plaintiff's attorney in preparing the 
nonionizing radiation injury claim. The article is divided into two ma-
jor sections. The first section provides a technical and legal over-
view. The second focuses on the litigation of the nonionizing radia-
tion injury claim. 
The first section of the article begins with a brief description of the 
nature and common sources of nonionizing radiation. Next, the cur-
rent status of the research on biological effects of exposure to non-
ionizing radiation is presented and discussed. An overview of ex-
isting federal and state regulatory schemes relating to nonionizing 
radiation follows. 
The second section of the article is devoted to a detailed examina-
5. See infra Section II.C., text and notes at notes 53-74. 
6. See Massey, supra note 3, at 118. 
7. See, e.g., studies cited in Lerner, RF Radiation: Biological Effects, IEEE Spectrum, Dec. 
1980, at 51. 
8. See Nat'l L. J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 1. 
9. See Id. at 24. 
10. See infra Section II.D., text and notes at notes 75-98. 
11. See infra Section III.C., text and notes at notes 170-210. 
12. See infra Section III.D. & E., text and notes at notes 211-379. 
13. See Nat'l L. J., supra note 8, at 24. 
1982-83] NONIONIZING RADIATION 967 
tion of methods of litigating a nonionizing radiation injury claim. 
First, it discusses statutes of limitations and proof of causation. 
These are two significant legal obstacles which virtually every plain-
tiff in a nonionizing radiation injury case is likely to encounter. Sec-
ond, the section specifically explores recovery under three existing 
theories: workers' compensation; strict products liability; and 
nuisance. The elements of each theory and the particular problems 
that plaintiffs proceeding under each theory are likely to encounter 
are discussed in depth. Finally, observations about the future in-
tersection of nonionizing radiation and the law are presented. 
II. BACKGROUND14 
A. Radiation and the Electromagnetic Spectrum 
Radiation is a general term used to describe the emission of energy 
from a source.15 The term radiation usually refers to the emission of 
electromagnetic energy.16 Electromagnetic energy includes gamma 
rays, X-rays, ultraviolet waves, visible light, infrared waves, 
microwaves, and radio waves. 17 
Electromagnetic radiation is measured in terms of either frequen-
cy or wavelength. Frequency, the number of oscillations per unit of 
time, is expressed in terms of cycles per second (hertz). 18 
Wavelength, the distance between corresponding points of two con-
secutive waves,19 is expressed in terms of meters. Mathematical for-
mulas relate the two measuring systems.20 Thus, reference to a par-
ticular frequency corresponds uniquely to a particular wavelength. 
The whole range of frequencies or wavelengths, from the lowest to 
14. For additional background information, see Massey, supra note 3, at 105-147. For an 
excellent collection of more technical background than is within the scope of this article, see 
Biological Effects and Medical Applications of Electromagnetic Energy, 68 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE IEEE (Jan. 1980) (a collection of papers describing the extent of environmental and pro-
fessionally encountered electromagnetic fields, microwave biological effects and medical ap-
plications of nonionizing radiation); Biological Effects of Electromagnetic Waves, 14 Radio 
Science, Nov.-Dec. 1979. 
15. Potential Health Effects of Video Display Terminals and Radio Frequency Heaters and 
Sealers: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight of the House Comm. on 
Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]. 
16. The term radiation may also refer to acoustic radiation, including sound and ultrasound. 
Id. at 28-29. See J. WILLIAMS, F. TRINKLEIN & H. C. METCALFE, MODERN PHYSICS 285, 691-93 
(1976). 
17. M. ALONSO & E. FINN, FUNDAMENTAL UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 763-67 (1967). 
18. D. HALLIDAY & R. RESNICK, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS 224 (1970). One thousand hertz 
are equivalent to one kilohertz (kHz); one thousand kilohertz equal one megahertz (MHz); and 
one thousand megahertz are equivalent to one gigahertz (GHz). Id. 
19. Id. at 304. 
20. See Id. at 304-305. 
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the highest, forms a continuum called the electromagnetic 
spectrum.21 The electromagnetic spectrum may be subdivided into 
many different regions where physical properties of the radiation in 
that segment of the spectrum are similar.22 For the purposes of this 
article, the important distinction is that between regions of the spec-
trum known as ionizing and nonionizing radiation. 
1. Ionizing Radiation 
The amount of energy emitted from a source is directly related to 
the frequency; the higher the frequency, the greater the energy 
associated with the radiation.23 Ionizing radiation is found at the 
higher frequencies along the electromagnetic spectrum.24 Ionizing 
radiation is so named because it contains sufficient energy to cause a 
neutral atom or molecule to acquire a positive or negative charge, in 
other words, become ionized.26 When biological matter is exposed to 
ionizing radiation, physical and chemical changes which may even-
tually lead to mutations, malignancies, and diseases occur within the 
living cells of the radiated matter. 26 
2. Nonionizing Radiation 
Nonionizing radiation does not possess enough energy to cause 
molecules or atoms to become ionized. On the electromagnetic spec-
trum, nonionizing radiation extends from ultraviolet radiation,27 
21. The following illustration appears in D. HALLIDAY & R. RESNICK, supra note 18, at 654. 
ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES 
Frequency, cycles/sec 
10 2 10· 106 
I I I 
Power 
108 10 10 1012 1014 1016 1018 10:11) 102:1 
I I I I I I I I I 1 
Microwaves Visible X-rays 
------
Radio --"i'ii'im.'il- - u~i.i Gamma rays 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
10 6 104 102 
Wavelength, meters 
The electromagnetic spectrum. Note that the wavelength and frequency scales are 
logarithmic. 
22. For example, visible light consists of that region of the electromagnetic spectrum that 
can be detected by the human eye. 
23. 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 28. 
24. Sources of ionizing radiation include gamma rays and X-rays. [d. See also supra note 21. 
25. Ionization is the production of electrically charged atoms or molecules. Massey, supra 
note 3, at 110. 
26. [d. 
27. "Near" or lower frequency ultraviolet radiation produces biological effects similar to 
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through visible light, infrared radiation, microwaves, and other 
radiofrequency (RF) radiation. 28 
Much of the public concern to date and most of the recent scientific 
research has dealt with the effects of radiofrequency and microwave 
radiation.29 Therefore, this article deals primarily with sources of 
nonionizing radiation in the microwave to radiofrequency ranges. 
The general term "nonionizing radiation" will be used to refer 
primarily to this area of the spectrum. It should be remembered, 
however, that nonionizing radiation includes emissions at both lower 
and higher frequencies as well.30 
B. Sources of Nonionizing Radiation 
Americans are exposed to nonionizing radiation from a wide varie-
ty of sources, including microwave ovens, radar, and high-voltage 
transmission lines.31 One of the most popular consumer products 
utilizing nonionizing radiation is the microwave oven. In 1978, ap-
proximately eight million such ovens were in use in American 
homes.32 Other household sources of nonionizing radiation include 
citizens' band radios and intrusion protection devices.33 Thus, 
sources of nonionizing radiation exist in millions of American 
households. 
Nonionizing radiation is also present in the workplace. It has been 
estimated that up to twenty-one million workers are currently ex-
posed to nonionizing radiation.34 As many as one million people could 
be exposed to nonionizing radiation from the use of radiofrequency 
(RF)· sealers alone.35 These sealers have been used for more than 
thirty years in a variety of industries.36 Specific uses include glue set-
ting; embossing and drying operations in the textile, paper, plastic, 
and leather industries; and curing of various materials, including 
those of other forms of nonionizing radiation, while "far" ultraviolet radiation produces 
biological effects more like those of ionizing radiation. Id. at 110 n. 3. See also supra note 21. 
28. 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 29. See also supra note 21. 
29. Massey, supra note 3, at 112. 
30. One source of lower frequency (60Hz) nonionizing radiation is extra-high-voltage power 
lines. Higher frequency nonionizing radiation sources include sunlamps and lasers. Id. 
31. 1979 Hearings, supra note 4, at 1. 
32. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., REPORT ON RADIATION HEALTH AND SAFETY 19 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as 
1978 REPORT]. 
33. Intrusion protection devices use electronic systems such as microwaves to detect and 
warn of the presence of unauthorized individuals. Id. 
34. 1979 Hearings, supra note 4, at 29 (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman). 
35. 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 429 (statement of Sheldon Samuels). 
36. See id. at 583 (listing of occupations which use RF sealers). 
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plasticized polyvinyl chloride, wood resins, polyurethane foam, con-
crete binder materials, rubber tires, and epoxy resins.37 Other 
workers commonly exposed to nonionizing radiation include 
operators of medical diathermy machines,38 radar and communica-
tions systems technicians,39 air traffic controllers,40 and those who 
use microwave ovens in their jobs.41 Workers in a wide variety of 
jobs, then, are routinely exposed to nonionizing radiation. 
Exposure to nonionizing radiation is not limited to the home and 
workplace. Nonionizing radiation-from both natural and man-made 
sources-also pervades the outdoors. Natural sources of nonionizing 
radiation include pulsed electromagnetic waves which occur ahead of 
a cold front or during an electrical storm,42 and extremely low-power 
fields of radiation from the Earth's atmospheric resonances.43 Man-
made devices, however, are the primary source of nonionizing radia-
tion outdoors. Man-made sources of nonionizing radiation are used 
by both the military and the private sector. The Department of 
Defense is the nation's largest user of nonionizing radiation 
devices.44 Its contribution to nonionizing radiation in the outdoor en-
vironment is mainly through the use of military radar tracking 
weapons and guidance systems, and communications installations. 45 
37. [d. at 457 (statement of Dr. Joe Lary). 
38. Microwave diathermy machines are used to relieve pain through the application of elec-
tromagnetic energy to body tissues. In administering these treatments the operator may be 
exposed to radiation which escapes from the intended treatment area. Ruggera, Measure-
ments of Emission Levels During Microwave and Shortwave Diathermy Treatments, 1980 
(HHS Pub. No. (FDA) 80-8119). 
39. Radar is an electronic system which uses radio waves to detect objects invisible to the 
naked eye because of distance, darkness, or cloud cover. The radar system transmits waves of 
radio frequency energy via a transmitting antenna. When the radio waves are interrupted by 
an object (the target), part of the energy (the echo) is reflected back and picked up by a 
receiver. The position of the target is then determined by measuring the time required for the 
radio wave to travel from the transmitter to the target and back to the receiver. Most radar 
systems operate at frequencies between 1,000 and 35,000 megahertz. 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA 368 (15th ed. 1980). Radio and television transmission operates on similar. prin-
ciples. See infra note 46. 
40. Air traffic controllers use radar screens to monitor the positions of aircraft. 1981 Hear-
ings, supra note 15, at 103 (statement of Dr. Milton Zaret). 
41. Microwave ovens are commonly used in restaurants, cafeterias, and other places where 
food is prepared. Microwaves are produced inside a microwave oven by an electron tube called 
a magnetron. The microwaves bounce back and forth inside the oven until they are absorbed 
by the food. Microwaves cause the water molecules in the food to vibrate, thereby producing 
the heat that cooks the food. It is not unusual for a small amount of microwave radiation to 
leak from an oven during operation. Microwave Oven Radiation (HHS Pub .. No. (FDA) 
80-8120). 
42. Massey, supra note 3, at 114 n. 40 (citing K. MARHA, J. MUSIL & M. 'l'uHA, ELEC-
TROMAGNETIC FIELDS AND THE LIFE ENVIRONMENT 43, 59 (1971». 
43. Lerner, supra note 7, at 51. 
44. 1978 REPORT, supra note 32, at 19. 
45. Massey, supra note 3, at 113. 
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Private sector sources of nonionizing radiation include radio and 
television transmitters,46 point-to-point microwave communications 
relay towers,47 satellite ground stations,48 and overhead high-
voltage electrical transmission lines.49 
The use of nonionizing radiation sources has increased rapidly 
throughout the past decade.60 In addition, continued research will 
certainly result in new ways to use nonionizing radiation in the 
future. Projected uses include such devices as auto collision 
avoidance systems61 and solar powered generators located in space 
which beam energy back to earth via microwaves.62 The increasing 
use of devices which emit nonionizing radiation, however, will ap-
parently not be without its health hazards. 
c. Health Effects of Exposure to Nonionizing Radiation 
The use of nonionizing radiation represents a major technological 
boon to our society. In almost every aspect of life-industry, 
medicine, communications, national defense, and even cooking-
ionizing radiation has been harnessed for our protection and conven-
ience. Thus, our society has a large stake in the continued use and 
proliferation of nonionizing radiation devices. As is often the case, 
however, scientific research on the biological effects of nonionizing 
46. Radio and television broadcast systems send radio frequency waves from transmitting 
antennas to receivers. AM radio broadcasting systems operate at frequencies between 535 and 
1635 kHz. FM radio stations and VHF television stations (channels 2 to 13) operate at frequen-
cies between 30 MHz and 300 MHz. UHF television stations (channels 14 to 83) operate at fre-
quencies between 0.3 and 3 GHz. Most space and satellite communications systems operate at 
from 3 to 300 GHz. 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 121aa (1977). 
There are approximately 10,000 radio stations and 1000 television stations operating in the 
United States, 1978 REPORT, supra note 32, at 19. 
47. Microwave relay towers transmit microwaves which are reflected by the Earth's 
ionosphere and received by stations in other countries. See 18 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 92 
(15th ed. 1980). 
48. Satellite ground stations transmit radio frequency signals to man-made satellites or-
biting the Earth. The equipment aboard the satellite receives the signals, amplifies them, and 
rebroadcasts them to another Earth station. This technology is used to provide international 
telephone service and to transmit live television programs and news events between countries. 
16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 261 (15th ed. 1980). 
49. High-voltage AC electrical transmission lines carry electric power across thousands of 
miles of the United States. Sixty-hertz electric fields are created in the areas surrounding the 
power lines. The strength of such fields is a function of the voltage of the line and the distance 
from the line. Exposure to 60 Hz electric fields has produced biological effects in rats and 
mice. As yet, however, the human health hazards associated with exposure to such fields are 
unknown. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 4, at 329. 
50. In 1976, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that 
radiofrequency and microwave sources alone were increasing at the rate of 15 percent annual-
ly. Massey, supra note 3, at 114. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. at 114 n. 36. 
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radiation has not kept pace with technological developments in the 
area. 58 Research is beginning to show that our progress in this field 
may be at the expense of the health of millions. 
1. Thermal Effects 
Most scientists agree that exposure to nonionizing radiation at 
power levels high enough to cause heating of body tissues, a 
phenomenon known as "thermal effects," can be a health hazard. 54 
Health hazards associated with exposure to radiation power den-
sities55 high enough to produce thermal effects include cataract for-
mation, brainwave pattern changes, skin burns, and birth defects.56 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has studied the extent 
to which thermal effects occur at various power densities. Its 
research indicates that at levels lef:ls than one milliwatt per square 
centimeter (1 mW/cm2), thermal effects are improbable; at levels be-
tween 1 to 10 mW/cm2, weak but noticeable thermal effects occur; 
and at levels greater than 10 mW/cm2, distinct thermal effects 
occur.57 Therefore, there is little dispute that exposure to nonioniz-
ing radiation at radiation power densities greater than 10 mW/cm2 
can be hazardous. 58 
2. Nonthermal Effects 
Once the existence of thermal effects was established, the scien-
tific community in this country assumed that these effects were the 
only health hazards presented by nonionizing radiation. 59 A report in 
1965 that the United States Embassy in Moscow was being ir-
53. [d. at 114-15. 
54. [d. at 115. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 118 (statement of Col. Philip Winter). 
55. Power density is the measure of the amount of power that passes through a square cen-
timeter of space per second. Massey, supra note 3, at 115 n. 42. It is expressed in terms of 
watts (W) per square centir.!d"r (cm2). Low power densities will often be expressed in terms of 
milliwatts (mW) or microwatts (uW) per square centimeter. One milliwatt is equal to one-
thousandth (0.001) of a watt. One microwatt is equal to one-thousandth of a milliwatt. 
56. See Massey, supra note 3, at 118. 
57. [d. (citing OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, EPA, REVIEW OF RADIATION PROTECTION Ac-
TIVITIES 1974 at 81 (1975». 
58. See, e.g., 1981 Hearings supra note 15, at 576 (citing JOINT NIOSH/OSHA CURRENT IN-
TELLIGENCE BULLETIN # 3, RADIOFREQUENCY (RF) SEALERS AND HEATERS: POTENTIAL HEALTH 
HAZARDS AND THEIR PREVENTION (Dec. 4, 1979». 
Exposure to nonionizing radiation power densities great enough to cause thermal effects is 
probably limited to certain occupational groups. Workers using RF sealers, for example, may 
be exposed to up to 100 mW/cm2 • Some warship personnel are also exposed to over 1 mW/cm2 • 
Lerner, supra note 43, at 52. 
59. See Massey, supra note 3, at 116 (citing Tyler, Overview of Electromagnetic Radiation 
Research: Past, Present and Future, in Biological Effects of Nonionizing Radiation, 247 AN-
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radiated by low-level microwave radiation-ten to fifteen microwatts 
per square centimeter (10 to 15 uW/cm2)-prompted new research 
into the effects of exposure to low-level nonionizing radiation.6o The 
new studies suggest that nonionizing radiation has significant health 
impacts beyond those associated with thermal effects. 
Today, few scientists would deny that exposure to low-level non-
ionizing radiation can, in some cases, cause biological effects other 
than heating of body tissues.61 There is still a controversy, however, 
about how these so-called nonthermal effects are produced and how 
much danger they present to humans.62 There are several reasons 
for the continuing controversy in this area. First, manufacturers 
continue to produce new devices for measuring exposure to nonion-
izing radiation.63 Therefore, earlier experiments must be repeated 
using these new, more sensitive devices. Second, evidence shows 
that effects of nonionizing radiation depend not only on the power 
density of the incident radiation, but also on such factors as frequen-
cy, intensity, duration, and number of exposures; the area of the 
body that is irradiated; individual tolerance differences; and even the 
presence of other environmental stresses such as high temperature 
and humidity.64 A third problem arises because most of the research 
in this country has been performed on animals, not on humans. Even 
where there is agreement among scientists about the effects of non-
ionizing radiation on animals, there is no consensus about how, or 
even if the results can be extrapolated to humans.66 Nearly all scien-
tists point to the lack of epidemiological studies66 as an explanation 
for the lack of conclusive results in this area.67 
Despite these problems, however, the evidence of low-level 
biological effects is increasing. Recognized effects include alteration 
in brain activity,68 behavioral changes,69 alteration of the blood-brain 
NALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 6, 7 (1975». 
60. Lerner, supra note 43, at 53. 
61. See id. at 54. 
62. See id. at 51. 
63. See, e.g., 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 525 (statement of Dr. David Conover). 
64. Massey, supra note 3, at 121-26; Galloway, BRH Update on Bioeffects of Microwave 
Radiation 4-5, a selected paper from A DECADE IN PROGRESS, 10TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CON· 
FERENCE ON RADIATION CONTROL, April 30-May 4, 1978, Harrisburg, Pa. [hereinafter cited as 
Galloway]. 
65. 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 118; 1978 REPORT, supra note 32, at 26, 39. 
66. Long-term studies of the incidence of disease in exposed human populations. WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 762 (1976). 
67. See, e.g., 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 458 (statement of Dr. Joe Lary); id. at 483 
(statement of Dr. Ralph J. Smialowicz). 
68. Galloway, supra note 64, at 2. 
69. [d. 
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barrier,70 interference with the immunological system,71 and general 
effects on growth and aging processes. 72 Scientists are still uncer-
tain however, about how these effects are produced, and about how 
much nonionizing radiation is needed to trigger them. Thus, most 
scientists agree that more research is needed.73 The perceived re-
search priorities are: effects of long-term, low-level exposure on 
animals; epidemiological studies; research into the mechanisms of 
biological interaction with nonionizing radiation; and additional 
development of techniques for computing comparable dosages, for 
measuring emissions, and for relating findings on animals to effects 
on man.74 As the evidence of a link between nonionizing radiation 
and biological effects accumulates, the next issue comes into focus: 
how have the Federal and state governments responded to this 
suspected health threat? 
D. Regulations and Standards Relating to Nonionizing Radiation 
1. Federal Regulations 
At present, the only mandatory federal standards relating to prod-
ucts which emit nonionizing radiation76 are the performance stand-
ards for microwave ovens,76 laser products,77 sunlamp products,78 
and high-intensity mercury vapor discharge lamps.79 These stand-
ards are promulgated by the Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) of 
the Department of Health and Human Services under authority of 
the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act.80 The standards set 
forth radiation emissions limitations and establish mandatory safety 
70. Id. The blood-brain barrier is the chemical barrier that prevents blood toxins from enter-
ing the brain. Massey, supra note 3, at 120. 
71. Galloway, supra note 64, at 4. 
72. See Massey, supra note 3, at 120. 
73. See, e.g., Galloway, supra note 64, at 6. 
74. 1978 REPORT, supra note 32, at 28-29. 
75. These standards relate to sources of RF, microwave, and all other forms of nonionizing 
radiation. 
76. 21 C.F.R. S 1030.10 (1981). 
77. Id. SS 1040.10, 1040.11 (1981). 
78. Id. S 1041.20 (1981). 
79. Id. S 1040.30 (1981). 
80. 42 U.S.C. SS 263b-263n (1976 & Supp. I 1977 & Supp. IV 1980). The Radiation Control 
for Health and Safety Act of 1968 was enacted to protect the public from the dangers of elec-
tronic product radiation. It provides for the establishment of a program to promulgate emis-
sions standards for products which emit ionizing or nonionizing radiation, and to encourage 
research into the effects and control of radiation emissions. Id. S 263b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
A proposed standard has also been issued for microwave diathermy machines, 45 Fed. Reg. 
50,359 (1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. S 1030.20). 
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features and warnings.81 Despite the existence of an enforcement 
and inspection program, however, it is difficult for BRH to enforce 
the standards once products leave the manufacturer.82 Since many 
products which emit nonionizing radiation do so in the course of 
operation, the absence of controls or safeguards at the user level is 
significant. 
The only federal standard regulating human exposure to nonioniz-
ing radiation is a voluntary occupational guideline of 10 mW/cm2 83 
set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)84 
of the United States Department of Labor. OSHA promulgated its 
standard as a mandatory radiation protection guide for exposure to 
nonionizing radiation frequencies between 10 Megahertz (MHz) and 
100 Gigahertz (GHz).86 In In re: Swim line COrp.,86 however, an ad-
ministrative law judge for the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission pronounced the standard "advisory" only. 
The 10 mW/cm2 standard has been sharply criticized by scientists 
and other groups for a number of reasons.87 First, the standard is 
based only on a consideration of thermal effects resulting from ex-
posure to nonionizing radiation,88 without regard to non thermal ef-
81. The microwave oven standard, for example, provides that radiation emitted "shall not 
exceed 1 milliwatt per square centimeter at any point 5 centimeters or more from the external 
surface of the oven, measured prior to acquisition by the purchaser, and thereafter 5 
milliwatts per square centimeter at any point 5 centimeters or more from the external surface 
of the oven." 21 C.F.R. § 1030.10(c)(l) (1981). The standard also provides for a system of safe-
ty interlocks and requires that the product be accompanied by specific user instructions and 
warning labels. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1030.10(c)(2)-1030.10(c)(6) (1981). 
82. The FDA estimates that less than one percent of all microwave ovens are inspected per 
year. Massey, supra note 3, at 138. 
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.97(a)(2) (1981). See infra note 86 regarding the involuntary nature of 
the standard. 
84. OSHA administers the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 29 U.S.C. §§ 
651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This Act authorized the establishment of mandatory occupa-
tional health and safety standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce. The 
Act provides for both on-site inspections of occupational conditions and proceedings to enforce 
these standards. Id. 
85. The standard is 10 mW/cm2 for periods of six minutes or longer, averaged over the six 
minute period. This includes continuous or intermittent radiation, and whole or partial body 
exposure. 29 C.F.R. S 1910.97(a)(2) (1981). 
86. EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH), 20,397 (Feb. 17, 1976), affd, EMPL. SAFETY & 
HEALTH GUIDE (CCH), 21,656 (Apr. 12, 1977). The employer was cited for a violation of the 10 
mW/cm2 exposure standard. The administrative law judge vacated the citation, finding the 
standard advisory rather than mandatory because the word "should" rather than "shall" was 
used in the regulation. Id. 
87. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman); 
Shore, Review of the History of the Ten-Milliwatt Per Square Centimeter Microwave Standard 
5, a selected paper from A DECADE IN PROGRESS, 10TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
RADIATION CONTROL, April30-May 4, 1978, Harrisburg, Pa. [hereinafter cited as Shore]. 
88. Shore, supra note 87, at 2. See generally Steneck, Cook, Vander & Kane, The Origins of 
the u.s. Safety Standards for Microwave Radiation, 208 SCIENCE, 1230 (1980). 
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fects. Second, critics point out that the 10 mW/cm2 standard con-
siders only power density. This ignores the importance of other 
parameters of radiation exposure such as wave frequency and dura-
tion of exposure.89 Finally, the United States exposure standard is 
much less restrictive than standards which have been promulgated 
in other countries.90 Thus, many critics question whether the United 
States standard is stringent enough to protect the public from harm-
ful exposure to nonionizing radiation.91 
2. State Regulations 
Few states are actively engaged in the regulation of nonionizing 
radiation sources.92 In Massachusetts, for example, public health 
statutes93 contain enabling legislation for the control of ionizing and 
nonionizing radiation hazards.94 Chapter 111, section 5B of the Mas-
sachusetts General Laws provides that the department of public 
health "may require registration of sources of ionizing and nonioniz-
ing radiation and shall, from time to time, after a public hearing, 
prescribe and establish rules and regulations to control the radiation 
hazards of . . . machines which emit ionizing and nonionizing radia-
tion for the purpose of protecting the general public .... "95 Pur-
suant to this statutory authority, Massachusetts has enacted exten-
89. Lerner, supra note 43, at 58. 
90. The proposed Chinese standard of 50 uW/cm2 is 200 times more restrictive than the 
10mW/cm2 OSHA standard. Microwave News, Vol. I, No.6, June 1981, at 1. The Soviet Union 
has an occupational standard of 10 uW/cm2 (1,000 times more restrictive than the OSHA 
standard) and a general population standard of 1 uW/cm2 (10,000 times more restrictive than 
the OSHA standard). Lerner, supra note 43, at 51. The Soviet exposure standards were based 
primarily on studies of occupationally exposed persons. From these studies, it was concluded 
that nonthermal effects did occur at low levels of exposure. Therefore, the Soviets set their 
standards accordingly. Massey, supra note 3, at 119 n. 72. 
"The additional factor of safety for members of the general population recognizes the addi· 
tional problem associated with uncontrolled exposure, in an uncontrolled environment, of an 
uncontrolled population of mixed sensitivity to radiation insult." Shore, supra note 87, at 3. 
There has been at least one report that the Soviet Union has raised its occupational exposure 
limit to 25 uW/cm2 • Microwave News, Vol. 1, No.8, Sept., 1981, at 4. The report could not be 
confirmed, however. [d. 
91. See, e.g., Shore, supra note 87, at 5; 1979 Hearings, supra note 4, at 97-100 (letter of Dr. 
Louis Slesin to Dr. Anthony Robbins); 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 98 (statement of John 
C. Viliforth). 
92. The results of a survey released by the New York State Department of Labor in 
January, 1981, revealed that only six states (Alaska, California, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, 
and Vermont) had actually promulgated RF/microwave exposure standards. State and Local 
Jurisdiction Summary of RFlMw Exposure Standards (unpublished survey available from the 
N.Y. State Dep't of Labor). 
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111-114 (West 1981). 
94. [d. ch. 111, S 5B (West 1981). 
95. [d. 
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sive regulations controlling the hazards of radioactive material and 
of machines which emit ionizing radiation.96 At present, however, 
the only regulations dealing with nonionizing radiation sources are 
those relating to lasers.97 Thus, while plenary enabling legislation 
does exist, Massachusetts has actually adopted very few regulations 
relating to nonionizing radiation sources.98 Since comprehensive 
regulation of nonionizing radiation exposure does not exist at either 
the federal of state level, persons allegedly injured by this exposure 
have turned to the courts for relief. 
III. LITIGATION 
The recent evidence that nonionizing radiation can produce harm-
ful effects in humans has spawned a "wave of litigation"99 springing 
from the use of nonionizing radiation by government and 
industry .100 This section of the article focuses on some of the more 
important methods and problems involved in litigating a nonionizing 
radiation injury claim. First, two obstacles facing virtually all non-
96. Rules and Regulations to Control the Radiation Hazards of Radioactive Material and of 
Machines Which Emit Ionizing Radiation, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 105, § 120.000 (1978). 
97. Rules and Regulations Relative to the Use of Laser Systems, Devices or Equipment to 
Control the Hazards of Laser Rays or Beams, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 105, § 121.000 (1978). 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health has recently proposed regulations of some 
additional nonionizing radiation sources. Regulations Governing Fixed Facilities Which 
Generate Electromagnetic Field in the Frequency Range of 300 kHz to 100 GHz. MASS. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 105, §§ 122.00-122.040 (proposed 1982). These regulations apply to any stationary 
facility which generates an electromagnetic field in the frequency range 300 kHz to 100 GHz 
and to any person who operates or controls the operation of such facility. MASS. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 105, § 122.001(A),(B) (proposed 1982). Several sources are excluded from regulation, 
however. These include: 
[d. 
(1) Facilities maintained by the Federal government. 
(2) All non-fixed radio frequency devices, machines, or facilities such as: portable, 
hand-held and vehicular transmission machines. 
(3) All scientific and medical equipment operating at frequencies designated for that 
purpose by the FCC and all Class A and B computing devices as defined by FCC. 
(4) Radio frequency machines which have an effective radiated power of 7 watts or 
less. 
(5) Radio frequency machines which are designated and marketed as consumer prod-
ucts (except microwave ovens) such as: citizen band radios, remote control toys, etc. 
(6) Radio frequency machines which are in storage, shipment or on display for sale, 
provided such machines are not operated. 
(7) Radio frequency machines not connected to a radiating device. 
98. Other states, including Arizona, Indiana, and Kentucky, also have enabling legislation, 
but have enacted no regulations relating to nonionizing radiation sources. 
99. Nat'l L. J., supra note 8, at 1, col. 1. 
100. The plaintiffs in the lawsuits which have been initiated thus far are a diverse group. 
They include former personnel of the United States Embassy in Moscow, former radar techni-
cians, communications systems operators, air traffic controllers, and users of microwave 
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ionizing radiation plaintiffs are examined: statutes of limitations, 
and proof of the causal connection between exposure to nonionizing 
radiation and the injury for which recovery is sought. Next, three 
bases of liability are analyzed: workers' compensation statutes; strict 
products liability theory; and the common law of nuisance. 
A. Statutes of Limitations 
A major problem facing the plaintiff in a nonionizing radiation case 
is a short statute of limitations. For example, most jurisdictions have 
a tort claims statute of limitations of no more than five years. lOl 
Similarly, most state workers' compensation statutes have notice 
and filing limitations of one or two years from the date of injury.lo2 
In many instances, the negative effects of exposure to nonionizing 
radiation do not manifest themselves until many years after ex-
posure. lOS Thus, where a statute of limitations or filing time period 
begins to run upon the exposure to nonionizing radiation, the claim 
can be barred if the plaintiff does not become aware of hi.s injuries 
within the short time limitation period. 
A short statute of limitations or filing period can preclude a plain-
tiff's recovery in some cases.104 This is not always true, however. In 
fact, there are three judicial approaches which alleviate some of the 
hardships imposed by short statutes of limitations. First, some states 
treat prolonged exposure to hazardous substances as a series of 
separate torts or injuries. lOS Under this approach, a new cause of ac-
tion accrues with each exposure, and the plaintiff's actiQn is not 
barred until the end of the statutory period following his last ex-
posure. 
ovens. Id. at 24-25. 
As a response to the recent suits, a symposium sponsored by major corporations was held in 
May, 1981, to educate corporate defense attorneys about recent medical and scientific infor-
mation regarding the use of nonionizing radiation. In addition, the Microwave Radiation Infor-
mation and Action Center has been formed in Washington, D.C. The Center will publish a 
newsletter and act as a clearinghouse for potential plaintiffs and attorneys involved in non-
ionizing radiation litigation. Id. at 24. 
101. Hurwitz, Environmental Health: An Analysis of Available and Proposed Remediesfor 
Victim.s of Toxic Waste Contamination, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 61, 73 (1981). 
102. Kutchins, The Most Exclusive Remedy Is No Remedy at All: Workers' Compensation 
Coverage for Occupational Diseases, 32 LABOR L. J. 212, 219 n. 50 (1981). 
103. See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979) (radar instructor exposed 
to microwave radiation from 1955 to 1957 whose injuries were not diagnosed until 1977). 
104. See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979); Schwartz v. Heyden 
Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963). 
105. Estep & VanDyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort 
Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 753, 761-62 (1964). Some of the states which have followed this theory 
are: Alabama: Augustus v. Republic Steel Corp., 100 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ala. 1951); Missouri; 
Farrar v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 361 Mo. 408, 235 S.W.2d 391 (1951); New Jersery: 
Biglioli v. Durotest Corp., 44 N.J. Super. 93, 129 A.2d 727 (1957); New York: Wright v. Carter 
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Even this accrual approach, however, presents problems for the 
victim of nonionizing radiation exposure. The problem is clearly 
evidenced in the recent case of Garrett v. Raytheon Co. 106 In Gar-
rett, a former radar instructor was exposed to "massive quantities" 
of microwave radiation from 1955 to 1957.107 He brought suit in 
February, 1978, against Raytheon Company and several other cor-
porations alleged to have been responsible for the design, manufac-
ture, installation, or maintenance of the radar systems. Although the 
plaintiff's radiation injury was not diagnosed until March, 1977, the 
court found that his cause of action accrued in 1957, the date of his 
last exposure to radiation.108 Therefore, the court held thatGarrett's 
action was barred by Alabama's one-year statute of limitations.109 
As a second means of alleviating the strict time requirement, some 
commentators have advocated a longer statute of limitations-thirty 
years, for example-in cases involving latent injuries. llo This ap-
proach could prevent the preclusion of many claims. Even a long 
statute of limitations, however, will not help the plaintiff whose in-
jury has not manifested itself within the statutory time period, a 
situation which is possible with some nonionizing radiation 
injuries. 111 
The third approach, application of the so-called "discovery rule," 
appears to be the most beneficial for the nonionizing radiation plain-
tiff. The discovery rule, as its name implies, provides that the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until such time as the claimant 
Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Tennessee: Armour & Co. v. Mitchell, 262 F.2d 580 
(6th Cir. 1958). 
106. 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979). 
107. Id. at 518. 
108. Id. at 521. See gerurrally Note, The Application of the Statute of Limitations to Actions 
for Tortious Radiation Exposure: Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 31 ALA. L. REV. 509 (1980). 
Alabama subsequently passed a statute of limitations for products liability actions involving 
some radiation injuries of one year from the date on which the plaintiff should reasonably have 
discovered the injury. The statute, however, limits all such actions to ten years from the time 
the product was first put to use. Id. at 516. 
109. 368 So. 2d at 521. 
110. See, e.g., Moore, Radiation and Preconception Injuries, Some Interesting Problems in 
Tort Law, 28 S. W. L. J. 414, 434 (1974). The author argues that thirty years would protect 
both the interests of the victim and the interests of the defendant who must defend against the 
stale claim. This idea was embodied in the 1975 extension of the Price Anderson Act (pro-
viding, inter alia, a strict liability cause of action for victims of an extraordinary nuclear acci-
dent) which lengthened the statute of limitations under the Act from ten to twenty years. See 
42 U.S.C. S 2210 (n) 0) (iii) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
111. There is evidence that exposure to radiofrequency/microwave radiation affects the 
reproductive systems of animals. 1981 Hearings, supra note 15, at 459 (statement of Dr. Joe 
Lary). If the same is true of humans, the effects of exposure to nonionizing radiation may not 
appear until the next generation. Therefore, it is likely that many of these claims would not be 
protected by a thirty-year statute of limitations. 
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discovers or reasonably should have discovered his injury .U2 In Urie 
v. Thompson,uS for example, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the case of a locomotive fireman who sought compensation 
for silicosis under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).u4 
FELA has a three-year statute of limitations.u6 The Court held in 
Urie that the cause of action did not accrue, and thus the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run, until the plaintiff either knew or had 
reason to know that he had contracted the disease.u6 
Since Urie, the discovery rule has been applied by many courts 
faced with similar factual situations.u7 Where the discovery rule has 
not been adopted, however, recovery for a latent effect of exposure 
to nonionizing radiation may be impossible. us In any event, it must 
be remembered that clearing the statute of limitations hurdle is only 
a threshold step; the claimant must now put forth a prima facie case. 
B. Causation 
The issue of causation is an essential element in the plaintiff's case 
whether he proceeds under a workers' compensation statute, U9 on a 
112. Conerly v. Morris, 575 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
113. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). 
114. 45 U.S.C. SS 51-60 (1976). The Federal Employers Liability Act (Railroads) provides 
that every railroad operating in interstate or foreign commerce shall be liable in damages to 
any person suffering injury or death while employed by such railroad in such commerce. 
115. 45 U.S.C. S 56 (1976). 
116. 337 U.S. 163, 170-71. 
117. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(statute of limitations in action against asbestos manufacturer for contraction of asbestosis 
begins to run when effects of exposure appear); United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 
1958) (claim under Federal Tort Claims Act for faulty medical advice did not accrue until ad-
vanced tubercular condition manifested itself); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164,371 
A.2d 170 (1977) (discovery rule held to apply to products liability case in which injury was 
allegedly caused by a drug); LeVine v. Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1972) 
(in foreign object malpractice action, cause of action did not accrue until the patient reasonably 
could have discovered the malpractice). 
118. In general, commentators note a trend toward application of the discovery rule. See, 
e.g., McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product 
Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416, 423 (1981) (14 states have specifically 
adopted the discovery rule in tort statutes of limitations, and courts in 27 more states have ap-
plied the discovery rule on at least one occasion); Comment, Statutes of Limitation Eased to 
Permit Latent Disease Claims, 11 ENVT'L L. REP., 10,082, 10,083 (1981) (noting trend favor-
ing adoption of a discovery rule). There is, however, a noticeable "counterflow." McGovern, 
supra, at 423. See also Bozzuto v. Oueillette, 408 A.2d 697 (Me. 1979) (plaintiffs ignorance of 
defendant's misfeasance did nothing to prevent the running of the statute of limitations in the 
absence of a showing of fraudulent concealment); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 
275 S.E.2d 900 (1981) (holding that cause of action accrues when injury occurs; the court em-
phasized that it was not adopting the "discovery rule"); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital, 47 
N.Y.2d 780,391 N.E.2d 1002, 417N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979)(injury occurs when there isa wrongful 
invasion of personal property rights, even though the injury is not discovered for 20 years). 
119. The causation element in workers' compensation schemes generally takes the form of a 
requirement that the worker's injury arise out of his employment. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
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strict products liability theory, or in nuisance. Under any of these ap-
proaches, the plaintiff must show a reasonable causal connection be-
tween exposure to nonionizing radiation and the damage which he 
has suffered.120 While the standard of proof of causation may be less 
rigorous under a workers' compensation statute than in a tort ac-
tion,121 the nonionizing radiation plaintiff faces similar problems in 
establishing the requisite causal link regardless of the avenue of 
recovery he pursues. 
Proving causation is the hardest task facing the nonionizing radia-
tion plaintiff. There are two major sources of difficulty. First, the 
presently available scientific evidence regarding the biological ef-
fects of nonionizing radiation on humans is inconclusive.122 To meet 
proof of causation requirements, the plaintiff, in effect, has to prove 
what science has not yet been able to prove. Second, nonionizing 
radiation injury does not usually manifest itself until long after ex-
posure has occurred;123 the diseases which result from exposure to 
nonionizing radiation can occur even without such apparent ex-
posure.124 These two factors present tremendous evidentiary 
obstacles for the plaintiff attempting to establish the causal link be-
tween exposure to nonionizing radiation and the resulting injury. 
1. Scientific Uncertainty 
Typically, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation,125 
Presently, there is little conclusive evidence of the harmful ef-
fects-particularly nonthermal effects-of nonionizing radiation. 126 
Shortcomings in scientific and medical knowledge, however, do not 
ANN. § 23-1021 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.021 (West Supp. 1982). 
The burden of proving causation in a workers' compensation case may sometimes be 
less rigorous than in a common law tort action. See, e.g., Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 2"36 
S.W.2d 977 (1951) (proximate cause in a workers' compensation action is not the same as prox-
imate cause in the law of negligence, but instead is cause in the sense that the accident had its 
origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee). See also O'Toole, 
Radiation, Causation and Compensation, 54 GEO. L. J. 751, 766 (1966) (arguing that the con-
text of liability should affect the required quantum of proof of causation). Nevertheless, the 
problems facing the nonionizing radiation plaintiff in proving causation will be similar, 
regardless of the theory under which he proceeds. 
120. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971). 
121. See supra note 119. 
122. See supra text and notes at notes 62-67. 
123. See supra note 103 
124. See supra text and note at note 56. 
125. See, e.g., Mahoney v. United States, 220 F.Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), affd, 339 F.2d 
605 (6th Cir. 1964); Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43 
(Tex. 1969). But see Favish, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden of 
Proof of Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 944, 963-72 (1981) (The author discusses cases 
in which the burden of factual causation has been shifted to the defendant). 
126. See supra text and notes at notes 62-67. 
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alter the plaintiff's legal burden of establishing causation.127 
Therefore, the victim of harmful exposure to nonionizing radiation 
must make the best use of existing evidence in order to establish the 
requisite causal link. Specifically, the plaintiff's attorney must use 
evidence of existing safety standards, statistical information, and ex-
pert witnesses in order to present the case effectively. 
a. Safety standards 
Violation of a safety standard by the defendant can be powerful 
evidence of causation for the plaintiff. This is especially true in a case 
where the plaintiff's injury is precisely the harm which the standard 
was meant to prevent.128 Some cases have stated in the extreme that 
violation of a statute or regulation bars the defendant from refuting 
causation altogether.129 Despite this legal approach, courts may be 
reluctant to go this far in a case where the scientific evidence of 
causation is uncertain. Nevertheless, the plaintiff should take full ad-
vantage of any evidence that the defendant has violated safety 
standards. 
On the other hand, defendants often use their compliance with 
government standards that limit exposure to harmful substances as 
evidence to refute the plaintiff's causation allegations. They argue 
that since the plaintiff was not exposed to the substance in excess of 
the amount permitted, his injuries could not have been caused by the 
sustained exposure.1SO Although some commentators suggest that 
compliance with standards should be a per se defense on the issue of 
causation,lSl the courts have held uniformly that, while this informa-
tion does have evidentiary value, it is not determinative of any 
issue.1S2 The argument against compliance as an absolute defense 
127. Robblee, The Dark Side of Workers' Compensation: Burdens and Benefits in Occupa-
tional Disease CCYVeraf/8, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 596, 605 (1978). 
128. See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609, 203 S.W. 555 (1918) (absence of 
fire escapes in violation of state statute presumed to be the proximate cause of victim's death 
in hotel tire). See also W. PRoSSER, supra note 120, S 41, at 243. 
129. Pirece v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 
(1957); Wilson v. Hanley, 244 Or. 570, 356 P.2d 556 (1960). These cases appear to be the excep-
tion, however. 
130. See, e.g., Mahoney v. United States, 220 F.Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), affd, 339 F.2d 
605 (6th Cir. 1964); Bulloch v. United States, 145 F.Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956). 
131. See, e.g., Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low-Level 
Radiation Emmple, 56 IOWA L. REV. 531, 574 (1971). 
132. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 580-83 (W.D. Oklo 1979) 
(compliance with government safety regulations should be accepted as evidence of acting 
reasonably, but should not be used as conclusive proof); Mahoney v. United States, 220 
F.Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), afld, 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1964) (compliance with guideline 
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should be especially persuasive in the nonionizing radiation case 
because existing standards are currently under attack and are based 
on uncertain scientific evidence. ISS 
b. Statistical studies 
The lack of conclusive evidence of the effects of nonionizing radia-
tion may force the plaintiff to rely heavily on statistical studies to 
demonstrate an unusually high occurrence of a particular disease 
among the exposed population. This type of evidence, however, 
presents two problems. First, there is currently a paucity of such 
data. ls4 Second, courts often reject proof of injury by inference from 
statistical data. ISS While courts recognize that statistics might in-
dicate proof of causation in a general population, they often hold that 
such proof does not necessarily extend to a particular member of 
that population. ls6 
There are indications, however, that courts are becoming more 
receptive to statistical evidence,ls7 particularly where such evidence 
has been supported by medical specialists. Nevertheless, the plaintiff 
in a nonionizing radiation case should approach the use of statistical 
studies with caution; such evidence must be painstakingly prepared 
and presented carefully. ISS Even with such precautions, there is no 
assurance that the evidence will be accepted as legally sufficient to 
demonstrate causation. 
c. The role of experts 
A more useful source of evidence for the nonionizing radiation 
plaintiff is expert testimony. The medical expert plays an important 
limits treated only as some evidence of lack of causal nexus between exposure to ionizing 
radiation and injury). 
133. See supra text and notes at notes 87-91. 
134. See supra text and note at note 67. 
135. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970); 
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on rehearing, 325 F.2d 673 
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. dRnied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), afj'd on rehearing per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 
(5th Cir. 1969). See generally Large & Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy 
Depends on the Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof with Legal 
Proof, 11 ENVT'L L. 555, 599 (1981). 
136. See supra cases cited at note 135. 
137. Large & Michie, supra note 135, at 602-03. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 
(D.C. Cir.1976), cert. dRnied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 
(1st Cir. 1974). 
138. For problems encountered in using statistical data see People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 
438 P .2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); Tribe, Trial fly Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in 
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971). 
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role in any case involving a technical question of medical 
causation.1S9 Experts usually testify about two "levels" of causation: 
first, whether the defendant's conduct could cause harm like the 
plaintiff's in any case; and, second, whether the defendant's conduct 
actually caused the plaintiff's injury in this case.140 In most instances 
where expert testimony is required, conclusive evidence exists as to 
the first level of causation.l41 Based on this evidence, the expert can 
give his opinion about the second level of causation. 
Plaintiffs seeking compensation for injuries resulting from ex-
posure to nonionizing radiation, however, face a double burden. In 
such cases, the medical and scientific evidence on both levels of 
causation are often contradictory and inconclusive.142 This is particu-
larly true where radiation in the nonthermal effects range is the 
alleged source of injury .14S Thus, the nonionizing radiation plaintiff 
must rely on the expert to convince the trier of fact of both levels of 
causation. 
In a case where the evidence of factual causation is complicated 
and contradictory, both parties must obtain the most highly qualified 
experts to testify. The recent case of Yannon v. New York Telephone 
CO.l44 clearly illustrates the importance of the role which highly 
qualified experts play in a case where the medical, scientific, and 
statistical evidence is inconclusive. Yannon, a New York Workers' 
Compensation Board case, represents the first damages award for 
death attributable to microwave injury.145 A three-member Workers' 
Compensation Board panel upheld the ruling of an administrative 
law judge that the claimant, a New York Telephone Company radio-
man, had died from overexposure to microwave radiation. 
During the course of the hearing in Yannon, the defendant's ex-
perts testified that there was no causal connection between 
Yannon's death and his exposure to microwaves.146 The plaintiff's 
witnesses, on the other hand, testified that Yannon's prolonged ex-
posure to microwave radiation resulted in the degenerative disease 
which ultimately caused his death.147 In its decision, the Board found 
139. See, e.g., Mahoney v. United States, 220 F.Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), afj'd, 339 F.2d 
605 (6th Cir. 1964). 
140. See id. at 831. 
141. See, e.g., Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 Mich. 105, 126-27,274 N.W.2d 
411, 420 (1979). 
142. See supra text and notes at notes 62-67. 
143. [d. 
144. N.Y.W.C.B. Nos. 07142308, 07523602 (1980). 
145. Microwave News, Vol. 1 No. 14, Apr. 1981 at 1; NAT'L L. J., supra note 8, at 24. 
146. Yannon v. N.Y. Telephone Co., N.Y.W.C.B. Nos. 07142308, 07523602 (1980) at 2-3. 
147. [d. at 2. Yannon had been exposed to microwaves for eleven years. Claimant's brief, 
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"a direct causal relationship between decedent's exposure to micro-
wave radiation during his employment and his subsequent disability, 
all of which ultimately resulted in his death."l4s The Board's opinion 
drew heavily upon the testimony of the experts and appeared to be 
based on an evaluation of the experts' credibility rather than an inde-
pendent analysis of the scientific evidence. l49 Credible expert 
witnesses, then, were essential to a ruling in favor of the plaintiff. 
Unlike the Yannon case, the plaintiff's presentation of qualified 
medical opinion as to causation may not always be enough. It has fre-
quently been noted that law and science have different standards by 
which to measure causation. l50 At law, the plaintiff need not prove 
the causal connection beyond a reasonable doubt;l5l he is required 
only to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, convinc-
ing the trier of fact that the defendant's conduct more probably than 
not caused his injury.l52 Medical experts base their opinions regard-
ing causation on etiology-the scientific theory of the causation of 
disease. l53 Where the etiology of a disease is uncertain, or where the 
effects of exposure to a substance are unknown, medical experts 
may be reluctant to testify as to distinct probabilities of injury.l54If 
the trier of fact is depending on experts' assertions of probability for 
its determination of causation, the experts' reluctance may result in 
a finding of no causation. l55 In most cases, a judicial finding of causa-
tion will turn neither on semantics nor on the use by a witness of a 
particular term or phrase, such as "medical certainty" or "more 
probably than not," to describe causation. l56 Courts will generally 
look to the evidence as a whole in determining whether the requisite 
legal causal nexus exists. l57 Nevertheless, the nonionizing radiation 
Yannon v. N.Y. Telephone Co., N.Y.W.C.B. Nos. 07142308, 07523602, at 1. 
148. Claimant's brief, Yannon v. N.Y. Telephone Co., at 3. 
149. [d. 
150. O'Toole, supra note 119, at 773. See also Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 
Mich. 105, 126-27,274 N.W.2d 411, 420 (1972); Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 
of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43, 49 (Tex. 1969). 
151. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 41, at 242. 
152. [d. at 241. 
153. O'Toole, supra note 119, at 767. 
154. See, e.g., Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43, 49 
(Tex. 1969); Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Commn'r., 155 W. Va. 726, 187 S.E.2d 
213 (1972). 
155. Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969); 
Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Commn'r., 155 W. Va. 726, 187 S.E.2d 213 (1972). 
156. Insurance Co. of North America v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. 1966) (reasonable 
probability of causation is determined by considering the substance of the expert's testimony; 
but doctor's testimony which did no more than express medical possibility of causal connection 
was not sufficient). 
157. See, e.g.,Besner v. Walter Kidde Nuclear Labs., 24 App. Div. 2d 1045, 265 N.Y.S.2d 
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plaintiff must recognize that proving causation will be difficult if his 
expert is unwilling to testify in terms of probabilities in a manner 
which respects legal as well as scientific standards of proof.168 
2. The Nature of the Harm 
The second problem facing the nonionizing radiation plaintiff at-
tempting to prove causation involves the nature of the harm. A plain-
tiff's claim in these cases typically involves an injury which manifests 
itself long after exposure to the radiation has occurred.169 Because of 
this time lag, certain evidence, such as the intensity and duration of 
exposure, may be unavailable by the time the plaintiff's case comes 
to trial. In addition, there may have been intervening factors since 
the time of the exposure which could have contributed to or caused 
the plaintiff's injury .160 Often these multiple intervening fac-
tors-age, stress, or environmental conditions-make the isolation of 
nonionizing radiation as the cause of an injury a problematic exercise 
of hindsight. Thus, the long latency period generally makes it very 
difficult to establish a direct causal link between the plaintiff's ex-
posure and his injury.161 
A further problem arises because the diseases caused by exposure 
to nonionizing radiation frequently are medical conditions which also 
occur in the general population.162 The plaintiff seeking compensa-
312, 313 (1965). 
158. A noteworthy case is Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). In that 
case, the court found cause in fact without the existence of a provable scientific eause and ef-
fect relationship. See Large & Michie, supra note 135, at 604-05. 
The scope of this article has necessitated only a very brief examination of the complex prob-
lems surrounding the differences between scientific and legal notions of causation. For further 
discussions in this area see Large & Michie, supra note 135; O'Toole, supra note 119. 
159. See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979). 
160. If, for example, the plaintiff is seeking recovery for cancer, he could have been exposed 
to another cancer-causing agent between the time of exposure to nonionizing radiation and the 
time of trial. 
161. Favish, supra note 125 at 964; Note, Updating the Injunction roProtectHu,manHealth 
and Safety, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 114, 124 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Updating the Injunc-
tion]. 
162. See supra text and notes at 53-74. This is unlike asbestosis, for example, which does 
not occur in the absence of exposure to asbestos fibres. 
163. See, e.g., Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W. 2d 43,48 
(Tex. 1969) (causes other than the plaintiff's on-the-job exposure to radiation, such as natural 
radiation, virus or infection, have not been designated improbable causes of the plaintiff's can-
cer). 
Courts most often make exceptions in workers' compensation cases. See, e.g., McAllister v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 408, 445 P.2d 313,71 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968) 
(recovery allowed for lung cancer linked to smoke inhalation by a veteran fire-fighter); 
Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 Mich. 105, 274 N.W.2d 411 (other possible or 
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tion for cataracts, for example, must prove that his condition more 
probably resulted from exposure to nonionizing radiation than from 
another natural or man-made source known to cause the same condi-
tion. This presents a tremendous, though not insurmountable, 
obstacle for the plaintiff in many cases.163 Consequently, the cir-
cumstances surrounding a nonionizing radiation injury-the latency 
of the injury and the possibility of intervening causes-contribute to 
the difficulty of the plaintiff's case. 
3. Easing the Burden of Proving Causation 
As the discussion above suggests, proving causation presents the 
greatest obstacle for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff. Scientific 
uncertainty and the nature of the plaintiff's injuries make it difficult 
to establish that nonionizing radiation probably caused the harm.164 
Commentators have recognized this problem and have proposed 
methods for easing the plaintiff's burdens in such cases. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested that, in the area of workers' compensa-
tion, a rebuttable presumption be created where strong support for a 
work-disease connection has been shown.165 This presumption would 
shift the burden of proof to the employer to show that a nonwork-
related factor produced the disease. 166 Another commentator has ad-
vocated a "floating burden of proof" to be determined by balancing 
the seriousness of the harm to the plaintiff, the benefits to the com-
munity from the defendant's conduct, and the degree of uncertainty 
regarding the causal link. 167 Still others have suggested the es-
tablishment of a victim compensation fund supported primarily by 
industry contributions. The fund would compensate some victims of 
exposure to harmful substances in the environment for medical costs 
and property damage upon the showing of a "reasonable likelihood" 
that exposure to hazardous substances released by the defendant 
caused or contributed to their injury.16s Plaintiff's attorney should 
probable causes of injury need not be excluded beyond doubt); Powell v. State Workmen's 
Compensation Commn'r, 273 S.E.2d 832, 836 (W. Va. 1980) (employee seeking compensation 
for lung cancer need not negative all possible nonoccupational causes of the disease). 
164. See supra text and notes at notes 125-63. 
165. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Compensating Victims]. 
166. Id. at 931. 
167. Kuster, Toxic Substances Contamination: The Risk-Benefit Approach to Causation, 14 
U. MICH. J. L. REF. 53, 56 (1980). 
168. Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries from Radiation, 24 LA. L. 
REV. 1, 49 (1963); Moore supra note 110, at 434. Such a fund for victims of hazardous waste 
contamination was proposed in the original "Environmental Emergency Response Act," (S. 
1480). The final version of the bill, the "Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
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urge the court to consider these alternatives and to adopt them 
where feasible. At the very least, such suggestions indicate a grow-
ing awareness in the legal community that problems of causation in-
volved in radiation exposure injuries are not fully addressed by tradi-
tional legal standards. 
If the court in the plaintiff's jurisdiction is unwilling to adopt one 
of these alternatives,169 the plaintiff's attorney must make the best 
use of available evidence to prove causation. Violations of applicable 
safety standards may be used to buttress the plaintiff's allegations of 
a causal nexus. Reliable, state-of-the-art statistical studies can also 
be very persuasive. Finally, the plaintiff must obtain highly qualified 
experts to testify that, in the context of the plaintiff's case" nonioniz-
ing radiation probably caused the plaintiff's injury, according to the 
best scientific understanding of such injuries. 
Statutes of limitations and proof of causation are two very difficult 
obstacles which virtually every nonionizing radiation plaintiff is like-
ly to encounter. The specific avenue of recovery that the plaintiff 
chooses to pursue, however, depends on the particular facts of his 
case. The remainder of this section explores three potential avenues 
of recovery for nonionizing radiation injury: workers' compensation, 
strict products liability, and nuisance. 
C. Workers' Compensation Relief 
A plaintiff alleging nonionizing radiation injury resulting from on-
the-job exposure170 can attempt to recover under a workers' compen-
sation statute.l7l The elements of a claim based on workers' compen-
sation will depend on the statutory scheme of the claimant's state 
and the judicial interpretation of that scheme. Workers' compensa-
tion schemes provide relief for injury arising out of employment 
without regard to negligence on the part of the employer.172 Many 
tion and Liability Act of 1980" (Superfund), Pub. L. No. 95-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 
eliminated victim compensation, however. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980). 
169. Courts and legislatures have not been quick to alter traditional concepts of causation. 
A notable exception is Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (the court ad-
dressed the problem of scientific uncertainty and applied a risk-benefit analysis in determining 
causation; note also that the court appeared to defer to the agency's expertise-an element 
lacking in most plaintiff injury suits). 
170. See supra text and notes at notes 34-41. 
171. Every state presently has some form of workers' compensation. 1 A. LARSON, THE 
LAW WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.30 (1978). It is important to note, however, that a 
workers' compensation remedy is exclusive of all other remedies by an employee or his 
dependents against the employer for the same injury. 2A Id. at § 65.00 (1982). 
172. lId. at § 1.10 
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statutes provide that once statutory filing limits are met,173 recovery 
is contingent only upon establishing the causal connection between 
the alleged injury and the employmentP4 Other state workers' com-
pensation schemes have inherent limitations which may present 
obstacles to recovery by the employee injured on the job by exposure 
to nonionizing radiation.176 
1. History of Workers' Compensation Statutes 
Workers' compensation statutes first appeared around the time of 
the Industrial Revolution in response to a tremendous increase in the 
number of workplace injuries.176 Because of the very limited tort lia-
bility of the master to his servant at common law, the vast majority 
of workplace accident victims received no compensation for their in-
juries.177 A system of workers' compensation gradually developed in 
the form of statutes which placed liability on the employer for all em-
ployee injuries arising out of his business.178 In effect, workers' com-
pensation served as a form of insurance that the employer would 
bear the cost of all injuries arising out of employment.179 
The early workers' compensation statutes were designed to pro-
vide compensation for accidental injuries directly traceable to sud-
den, unexpected occurrences in the workplace.18o As time went on, 
courts and legislatures began to broaden workers' compensation 
coverage to include benefits for victims of work-related diseases as 
well.181 This broadening is significant for the nonionizing radiation 
claimant. In most instances of nonionizing radiation injury there is 
no traumatic, time-definite event such as that anticipated and re-
quired by the early workers' compensation statutes. Instead, the in-
jury results from "ordinary," routine exposure to nonionizing radia-
tion over a long period of time, and is more accurately characterized 
as a disease. Their expansion to include work-related diseases makes 
workers' compensation statutes a potential means of recovery for 
exposure to nonionizing radiation. 
173. See supra text and note at 102. 
174. See supra text and notes at notes 119-63. 
175. See infra text and notes at notes 186-208. 
176. See Kutchins, supra note 102, at 212. 
177. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 80, at 525-30. 
178. Id. at 531. 
179. See id. 
180. Larson, Occupational Diseases Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 9 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 87 (1974). 
181. Kutchins, supra note 102, at 212. 
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Today, every state has general compensation coverage for occupa-
tional diseases.182 The development of this coverage, however, has 
differed from state to state. In Massachusetts, for example, the 
courts expanded the statutory definition of injury to include occupa-
tional diseases.18s Other states specifically included coverage for 
diseases in their workers' compensation statuteS.184 Still other states 
enacted statutes which exclusively encompass occupational 
diseases.18s Given this varied development, the problems faced by 
the nonionizing radiation plaintiff differ from state to state. Two 
commonly encountered problems, however, are a requirement that 
the injury arise out of an occupational "accident," and that such in-
jury fall within the statute's often narrow definition of "occupational 
disease." 
2. The Injury "By Accident" Requirement 
Many states have chosen to provide benefits for occupational 
diseases by specifically amending existing injury coverage statutes 
to include diseases.186 Several of these states, however, continue to 
require an "accidental" incident as a prerequisite to 
compensation.187 This has caused some courts, in interpreting these 
statutes, to look for a sudden, unexpected event which caused the 
disease.188 This may present an in~ignificant problem for the non-
ionizing radiation claimant who has been exposed to a sudden burst 
of radiation. On the other hand, it can serve to deny the claims of 
those workers who allege injury from chronic, routine workplace ex-
posure to nonionizing radiation. With the expansion of occupational 
disease legislation, the "by accident" clauses have clearly lost some 
of their force over the years.189 In some cases, however, they con-
tinue to result in the denial of benefits for diseases associated with 
chronic workplace exposure to harmful agents.190 
182. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 171, S 41.00 (1980). 
183. See, e.g., In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N.E. 336 (1914); Johnson v. London Guar. & 
Accident Co., 217 Mass. 388,104 N.E. 735 (1914). 
184. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. S 44-5aOl (1981); N. D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-02 (8) (a) (Supp. 
1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 102.01(2)(c) (West 1981-1982). 
185. See, e.g., ALA. CODE SS 25-5-110 to 25-5-123 (1975 & Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. SS 
22-3-7-1 to 22-3-7-38 (Burns 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, S 1201 (Purdon 
1952). 
186. See supra note 184. 
187. See Compensating Victims, supra note 165, at 921. 
188. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gulfport Laundry & Cleaning Co., 249 Miss. 11, 162 So. 2d 859 
(1964) (claimant denied compensation for nervous condition caused by overwork where no acci-
dent or unusual event had occurred). 
189. 1B A. LARsoN, supra note 171, S 41.31. 
190. See, Compensating Victims, supra note 165, at 921 n.42. 
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3. Narrow Statutory Definitions of "Occupational Disease" 
Some states have added sections to their workers' compensation 
statutes providing compensation for occupational diseases.191 Other 
states have enacted entirely separate acts to provide such compensa-
tion.192 In both situations problems may still exist for the nonionizing 
radiation claimant. The major source of these problems is the usually 
narrow statutory definition of occupational disease. This definition 
may take the form of an exclusive schedule of compensable 
diseases;193 a requirement that the disease be peculiar to the employ-
ment;194 or an exclusion for ordinary diseases of life.196 
a. Schedules 
In some states, occupational disease is defined by an enumerated 
exclusive schedule of diseases for which benefits will be provided.196 
While this is clearly advantageous to the claimant whose injury ap-
pears on the schedule, it poses an insurmountable obstacle for the 
claimant whose disease is not listed. This obstacle exists even where 
there is a clear connection between the disease and the employ-
ment.197 Many of the states that use the schedule-type coverage, how-
ever, have recently added a catch-all phrase which provides for com-
pensation for any occupational disease, as long as it is shown to have 
arisen from the employment.19B Thus, in these states, the nonioniz-
ing radiation plaintiff's chances for success are greatly enhanced. 
b. "Peculiar to employment" requirements 
States often limit coverage for occupational diseases by requiring 
that the disease for which compensation is sought be peculiar to the 
worker's occupation.199 This requirement presents a serious obstacle 
to recovery for the nonionizing radiation claimant. Damaging expo-
191. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314 (1947); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.804 (1979). 
192. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN., §§ 22-3-7-1 to 22-3-7-38 (Burns 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1201 (Purdon 1952). 
193. See infra text and notes at notes 196-98. 
194. See infra text and notes at notes 199-204. 
195. See infra text and notes at notes 205-07. 
196. See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. COMPo LAW § 3(2) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1981-82); P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 11, § 3 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-2 (1956). 
197. Of those statutes which contain a schedule of diseases, none could be found which 
specifically lists injury from nonionizing radiation. Where radiation injuries are compensable, 
they are sometimes limited to injuries from exposure to ionizing radiation. E.g., NEV. REV. 
STAT. S 617.450 (1981). 
198. See, e.g., N.Y. WORIC COMP. LAW S 3 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1981-82); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. S 4123.68(BB) (Baldwin Supp. 1981). 
199. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 25-5-11O(i) (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 28-34-1(c) (1956). 
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sure to nonionizing radiation most often manifests itself as a disease 
which also occurs among members of the general population who are 
not exposed to nonionizing radiation in their jobs. Courts have, in the 
past, denied recovery where the disease is not peculiar to the 
worker's occupation.200 
On the other hand, some courts have been more lenient in their in-
terpretation of "disease peculiar to employment" clauses. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted disease 
"peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged"201 
as not meaning "exclusive to" that employment.202 Instead, the 
court held that, assuming the disease arose out of the employment, it 
would be compensable if the conditions of employment created a 
hazard distinct from those in most other occupations.203 The court 
reasoned that any other use of the phrase would place an unreason-
able burden on the employee and would do injustice to the beneficent 
nature of workers' compensation legislation.204 Thus, while the 
"disease peculiar to employment" requirement may not necessarily 
bar the nonionizing radiation claimant's compensation, it should be 
noted that the possibility exists. 
c. "Ordinary diseases of life" limitations 
Some states limit the definition of occupational disea.ses by ex-
cluding "ordinary diseases of life" from coverage.205 Since harmful 
exposure to nonionizing radiation often manifests itself as a disease 
which also occurs among the public generally, this exclusion presents 
another obstacle to the claimant seeking compensation for nonioniz-
ing radiation injuries. As in the "disease peculiar to employment" 
limitation, some courts have adopted a narrow interpretation of the 
statutory language and denied claims for diseases which are found 
200. See, e.g., Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 203 Pa. Super. 459, 201 A.2d 243 (1964) 
(compensation denied widow of employee where court took judicial notice of the fact that lung 
cancer was not peculiar to the employee's industry). But see Utter v. Asten-Hill Mfg. Co., 453 
Pa. 401, 309 A.2d 583 (1973) (cancer can be an occupational disease though it exists in the 
general public, if it is "peculiar to the claimant's occupation by its causes and the 
characteristics of its manifestation"). 
201. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-33 (1978). 
202. Martinez v. Univ. of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 457, 601 P.2d 425, 427 (1979) (petitioner was 
not required to show that anxiety neurosis was suffered exclusively by members of his occupa-
tion in order to qualify for benefits). 
203. [d. For cases reaching a similar conclusion see, e.g., Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 
118 Conn. 29, 170 A. 146 (1934); Gaddis v. Rudy Patrick Seed Div., 485 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. App. 
1972); {Ttter v. Asten Hill Mfg., 453 Pa. 401, 309 A.2d 583 (1973). 
204. Martinez v. Univ. of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 457, 601 P.2d 425, 427 (1979). 
205. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS S 418.401(c) (1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.067 (Vernon 
Supp. 1982). 
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among the general public.206 On the other hand, many courts have 
softened the harsh effects of the "ordinary disease of life" exclusion 
by allowing compensation for a disease which also occurs among the 
general public when conditions of employment present a hazard 
greater than or different from the risk to the public generally.207 
Thus, epidemiological studies showing a statistical concentration of a 
certain disease among workers in a particular occupation can be 
helpful to the plaintiff. 
To summarize, the success of a claimant seeking compensation for 
nonionizing radiation injuries under workers' compensation statutes 
depends, to a great extent, upon the state's statutory scheme and 
the judicial interpretation of that scheme. There are, however, some 
particular problems of which the claimant's attorney should be 
aware. In addition to proof of causation208 and statutes of limita-
tions209 problems, the claimant may face legal obstacles such as a re-
quirement that the injury occur "by accident;" a narrow statutory 
definition of occupational disease which limits recovery to those ill-
nesses covered by a schedule; or an exclusion of diseases occurring in 
the general population. Nevertheless, workers' compensation 
statutes present a potential avenue of recovery for the nonionizing 
radiation plaintiff injured on the job. Courts have been willing, in 
some cases, to apply the accidental injury requirement expansively 
so as to include occupational disease claims. In addition, courts have 
liberally interpreted narrow statutory definitions of coverage in 
order to reach more reasonable results. Because workers' compensa-
tion schemes are intended to provide compensation to all workers 
whose injuries arise out of employment,210 plaintiffs' lawyers should 
urge that such interpretations be adopted by their courts. If they are 
successful, the prospects of recovery for nonionizing radiation injury 
under workers' compensation will be greatly improved. 
D. Strict Products Liability 
1. Development of the Strict Liability Cause of Action 
206. See, e.g., Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 32 N.C. App. 185, 231 S.E.2d 187 (1977) 
(compensation for hepatitis denied to laboratory worker handling hepatitis-contaminated 
blood). 
207. The broader interpretation appears to be the more common. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers 
Mfg. v. Indus. Comm., 33 III. 2d 268, 211 N.E.2d 276 (1965); Collins v. Neevel Luggage Mfg., 
481 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. App. 1972). 
208. See supra text and notes at Section IILB. 
209. See supra text and notes at Section IILA. 
210. See supra text and notes at notes 178, 179. 
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The law of products liability deals with the liability of sellers or 
suppliers of goods to third persons with whom they are not in privity 
of contract.211 Traditionally, products liability actions have been 
brought under theories of negligence and/or implied warranty.212 
The plaintiff alleging negligence as a basis for a products liability 
action must show that the defendant-usually the product manufac-
turer or seller-did not exercise reasonable care in producing or 
marketing the product.213 
The earliest products liability actions brought under a negligence 
theory were often frustrated by the firmly established rule that the 
manufacturer's duty extended only to the immediate purchaser.214 
The landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,216 
removed that legal obstacle by holding the manufacturer liable to a 
subsequent purchaser of the product under ordinary principles of 
tort law. After MacPherson, however, the products liability plaintiff 
still faced the tremendous burden of proving that a negligent act had 
occurred during the long and often complex path from manufacture 
to sale.216 
Around the beginning of the 20th century, partly as a result of the 
problems in proving negligence in product liability actions, plaintiffs 
began to rely on warranty concepts to establish that a product was 
not of merchantable quality when sold.217 The implied warranty ap-
proach was advantageous to the plaintiff because it did not require 
proof that the seller had been negligent. To recover, the plaintiff had 
to prove only that the product was not fit for the ordinary purpose 
for which it was sold.218 
In many cases, however, courts continued to require privity be-
tween the buyer and seller. This judicial requirement effectively 
denied recovery in products liability cases, since, in the typical situa-
tion, no privity existed between the plaintiff, who bought from a 
dealer or retailer, and the manufacturer. This situation existed until 
211. W. PRoSSER, supra note 120, at 641. 
212. See generaUy Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 V AND. L. REv. 593 (1980). 
213. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 96, at 644. 
214. See, e.g., Hasbrouk v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N.W. 157 (1909). Thus, the 
customer who purchased from a retailer would have no cause of action against the manufac-
turer. 
215. 217 N.Y. 382,111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
216. S~ Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 595-96. 
217. W. PRoSSER, supra note 120, S 97, at 650; Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 594. 
218. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 V AND. L. REV. 551, 
552-53 (1980). 
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the leading decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor's Inc.,219 
dispensed with the privity requirement in warranty cases. 
Plaintiffs continued to face complications even after Henningsen, 
because warranties on the sale of goods were governed by the 
Uniform Sales Act, and its successor, the Uniform Commercial 
Code.220 Both statutes had been drafted with the view that contracts 
would exist between sellers and their immediate buyers.221 
Therefore, the plaintiff with a cause of action in implied warranty 
against a distant manufacturer continued to face problems because 
his contractual relationship was usually with the seller, not the 
manufacturer.222 
The inability of the negligence and warranty theories to afford 
relief to many of those injured by defective consumer goods even-
tually led to the application of a strict liability theory to these 
cases.228 In general terms, strict liability imposes liability for injury 
without requiring proof of the defendant's fault. 224 The imposition of 
strict liability often involves a policy determination that the cost of 
an injury should be borne by the party best able to bear it.225 The 
elements of the strict products liability cause of action are set out in 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section 
states: 
Spe:cial Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to 
User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling a product, and (b) it is ex-
pected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated 
in Section (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user and consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 226 
219. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
220. U.C.C. SS 2-313, 2-314. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 97, at 655. 
221. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 97, at 655. 
222. These problems include provisions which preclude the buyer from recovering unless he 
gives notice of the breach of warranty to the seller, and disclaimers of warranty by the seller 
which in effect defeat the warranty. Id. at 655-56. 
223. See generally id. S 98. 
224. See generally id. S 75. 
225. Id. at 495. Outside the area of products liability, strict liability is most often applied in 
cases involving ultrahazardous activities. See generally id. S 78. 
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1977). 
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Thus, strict products liability makes it unnecessary for the plaintiff 
to prove negligence or breach of warranty. All that the plaintiff must 
do is show that the product which caused his injury was in a defective 
condition when it left the defendant's control.227 
One of the first cases to apply strict liability theory to a defective 
product was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 228 Greenman 
involved a suit brought by a man who was injured while using a 
power tool. The court held that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in 
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be 
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that 
causes injury to a human being."229 The court reasoned that strict 
liability, rather than implied warranty, is appropriate in products lia-
bility actions because it insures that the costs of injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by those most able to do so-the 
manufacturers and/or sellers.23o Today, nearly every state recog-
nizes some form of strict products liability;231 most of these states 
cite section 402A and Greenman as the authoritative legal basis of 
the doctrine.232 
Despite its widespread recognition, the development of strict prod-
ucts liability law has not been orderly. Confusion has resulted as 
courts have set about applying the elements of strict products liabili-
ty to the facts of particular cases.233 The most troublesome element 
of strict products liability for the courts has been that of defining 
what makes a product "defective."234 Courts have used a variety of 
tests for this purpose.235 The resulting confusion has led one com-
mentator to observe that strict liability law has become "a swampy 
quagmire ... [which] threatens to split into several different 
streams with diverse destinations."236 
The nonionizing radiation plaintiff who pursues a cause of action in 
strict products liability will find himself in the midst of the confusion 
surrounding the definition of a defective product. Therefore, in 
order to assist the nonionizing radiation plaintiffs attorney in pre-
227. See Wade, supra note 218, at 553. 
228. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
229. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. 
230. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
231. PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) , 4016 (1981) (44 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia have adopted some form of strict products liability). 
232. Thirty-six ·states have adopted strict liability in the form set out in § 402A of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). [d. 
233. See Wade, supra note 218, at 557. 
234. Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 597-600. 
235. See infra text and notes at notes 241-74. 
236. Wade, supra note 218, at 557. 
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paring a strict products liability case, the remainder of this section 
will focus on the concept of a defective product. First, the discussion 
will focus on those situations in a strict products liability action in 
which the need to define the term "defect" arises. Second, the 
various judicial tests for determining whether a defect exists, and 
the problems each test may present for the nonionizing radiation 
plaintiff will be explored. Finally, the discussion will turn to an 
analysis of the approach to defective product cases adopted in the 
Uniform Products Liability Act. 
2. Defining "Defective" 
a. Manufacturing or design defect 
There are two distinct situations in which a defect can arise. First 
is the case in which the product becomes dangerous as a result of 
manufacturing errors. Second is the case where the product 
presents a risk of harm due to an intentional design decision. In the 
former case, the meaning of "defect" usually creates little difficulty: 
a product is defective if it is different from the standard produced by 
the manufacturer.237 The manufacturer may, therefore, be liable for 
any injuries caused by the product, notwithstanding the use of due 
care in the preparation and sale of the product.238 In the design 
defect case, however, the definition is not so simple because the 
product has reached the consumer as the manufacturer intended. 
Nevertheless, some aspect of the manufacturer's conscious design 
decision has harmed the plaintiff. Thus, the courts have tried, in 
these latter cases, to determine at what point the design decisions 
were so unjustifiable as to make the product defective in the eyes of 
the law. 
The circumstances of each case will determine whether a manufac-
turing or design defect theory is most appropriate for the particular 
nonionizing radiation plaintiff. Since the meaning of manufacturing 
defect should present few problems,239 this section will focus on 
those cases in which the plaintiff alleges injury from a design defect. 
b. Tests for defining a design defect 
Courts have set about determining what constitutes a design 
defect in numerous ways. Most courts agree, however, that a deter-
237. Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 599; Wade, supra note 218, at 55l. 
238. Hall v. Chrysler Corp., 526 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Michigan Law). 
239. See supra text and notes at notes 237, 238. 
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mination of strict products liability for design defects should not 
focus on the negligence-laden concept of the manufacturer's con-
duct, but instead should concentrate on the condition of the product 
itself.240 Following this rationale, some courts test for design defect 
by asking whether the product meets ordinary consumer expecta-
tions of safety;241 others ask whether a reasonable manufacturer 
with knowledge of the product's propensity to injure would have sold 
the product despite its hazards;242 still others use a combination of 
testS.243 Since the means of defining design defect varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, each of the above tests will be briefly ex-
plained. 
i. The consumer expectations test 
In 1965, two years after the Greenman case was decided, the 
American Law Institute published its final version of section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.244 Comment i to this section ex-
plains that "[t]he rule stated in this section applies only where the 
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer."245 The comment continues by defining 
"unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur-
chases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as 
to its characteristics."246 Today, virtually every state has adopted 
section 402A,247 and courts in many of these states rely on the defini-
tion of unreasonably dangerous found in comment i. 248 
From the nonionizing radiation plaintiff's perspective the "con-
sumer expectations" test appears to be a favorable approach. The or-
dinary purchaser of a microwave oven, for example, would not ex-
240. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443,447, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 225, 229 (1978). 
241. See, e.g., Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E. 2d 671 (1978). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A comment i (1977). 
242. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Keeton, 
Man1lrfacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Man1lrfacture and Design of Prod-
ucts, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 568 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for 
Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825 (1973). 
243. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 
(1978); Caterpiller Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). 
244. Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 598. 
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, S 402A comment i (1977). 
246. Id. 
247. PROD. LIAB. REp. (CCH) , 4016. See also supra note 231. 
248. See Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E. 2d 671 (1978). See generally PRoD. 
LIAB. RI:;P. (CCH) , 4015. 
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pect to be exposed to a harmful substance. Critics of the consumer 
expectations test, however, argue that it is difficult to apply in cases 
involving technologically complex products about which the con-
sumer may not know enough to have accurate safety expectations.249 
In addition, one court, purporting to follow comment i to section 
402A, based its decision not on the expectations of the ordinary con-
sumer, but on the expectations of a person with the special 
knowledge of the particular consumer (in this particular case, plain-
tiff's decedent}.25o While such interpretive applications can pose 
problems for the plaintiff, they do not appear to present a major dif-
ficulty for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff in a jurisdiction which 
has adopted the consumer expectations test. 
ii. "The reasonably prudent manufacturer" test 
A second test for defining design defects, the so-called 
"reasonably prudent manufacturer" test,251 has been applied by 
some courts and advocated by commentators.252 This test defines a 
defect by assuming that the seller or manufacturer knew of the prod-
uct's propensity to injure.253 The test then considers whether, with 
such knowledge, the seller or manufacturer would have been 
negligent in selling the product without a warning.254 Although this 
test sounds like a negligence test, it is actually a test in strict liability 
because the courts' impute to the manufacturer knowledge of the 
product's propensity to cause harm. 
The major difficulty with applying the reasonably prudent 
manufacturer test lies in determining how much knowledge of the 
product's propensity for injury will be imputed to the manufacturer. 
The views of Dean Wade256 and Dean Keeton,266 two of the nation's 
foremost writers on the subject of products liability, represent the 
most common approaches to imputing knowledge to the manUfac-
turer. Under Dean Wade's approach, knowledge of the product's 
propensity for harm as that knowledge existed at the time of 
249. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning oj Deject, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 37 (1973); 
Wade, supra note 242, at 829. It may also be argued, however, that one need not know how a 
product works to have an expectation of safety. 
250. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. at 471-72, 242 S.E.2d at 680. This approach, 
however, appears to be the exception. 
251. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). 
252. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 242; Wade, supra note 242. 
253. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 491-92, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974). 
254. [d. 
255. John W. Wade, Distinguished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, Reporter, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). 
256. W. Page Keeton. Dean of the University of Texas Law School. 
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manufacture is imputed to the manufacturer. 267 In contrast, Dean 
Keeton would impute to the manufacturer knowledge of all risks 
known at the time of trial.268 
Since the test is not one of negligence, it is not based upon the 
risks and dangers that the maker should have, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, known about. It is, rather, danger in fact, as that 
danger is found to be at the time of the trial that controls.269 
Thus, Dean Keeton would impute knowledge of even those dangers 
that were scientifically unknowable at the time of manufacture.26o 
This distinction is crucial for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff if 
the defendant claims that his product's propensity for injury was 
scientifically unknown or unknowable at the time he placed it on the 
market. Under the Wade approach, only knowledge that existed at 
the time of manufacture is imputed to the defendant. Thus, if the de-
fendant convinces the jury that the dangers of nonionizing radiation 
were not known at the time the product was made, he will likely 
defeat the plaintiff's claim.261 The Keeton approach, on the other 
hand, does not excuse the defendant merely because the dangerous 
propensity of the product was scientifically unknowable at the time 
of manufacture.262 Thus, under the Keeton approach, the defendant 
in a nonionizing radiation case would be charged with knowledge of 
his product's harmful character, whether or not he could have had 
such knowledge at the time he placed the product on the market. 
Whether the product is defective would then be determined by ask-
ing whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, knowing 
of the particular risk, would have put the article into the stream of 
commerce.26S 
257. Wade, supra note 242, at 839-40. 
258. Keeton, supra note 242. 
259. [d. at 568. 
260. Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 622. 
261. See, Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E. 2d 194 (1980) (holding that 
manufacturer could not be held liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it would be im-
possible to know). 
262. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976) (under strict liability 
theory, a manufacturer must warn of dangers and risks, whether or not a causal relationship 
between use and injury has been definitively established at the time of the warning); Cepeda v. 
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152,386 A.2d 816 (1978) (foreseeability of dangerous proclivi-
ty of the product is not requisite to liability); Newman v. Utility Trailer and Equip. Co., 278 Or. 
395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977) (in applying strict liability, it is assumed that the manufacturer or 
seller was aware of the risk involved whether or not the manufacturer had such knowledge or 
reasonably could have had it). 
263. The determination of reasonableness proceeds on a case-by-case basis and usually con-
sists of a balancing of various risk-utility factors. Wade, supra note 242, at 837-38. 
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There are sound reasons for applying the Keeton analysis. By 
making foreseeability of the product's propensity to injure irrele-
vant, the Keeton approach is faithful to the concept of strict liability. 
The Wade approach, on the other hand, blurs the distinction between 
strict liability and negligence by considering the foreseeability of the 
harm at the time of manufacture.264 The deficiency in the Wade ap-
proach is considered justified by the otherwise adverse impact the 
Keeton approach would have on the development and introduction of 
new products to the marketplace. For example, the Wade analysis 
has often been used in cases involving drug manufacturers.265 
Courts reason that to hold a drug manufacturer liable for side effects 
which were not known at the time the drug was marketed would 
deter other drug manufacturers from introducing potentially 
beneficial products for fear that they would be held liable for any 
number of unknowable side effects.266 With the possible exception of 
machines used to diagnose or treat illness, the potential benefits of a 
new product which emits nonionizing radiation, however, are 
arguably not as great as the potential benefits of a new "wonder 
drug." Therefore, use of the Keeton approach would appear to be 
both more faithful to the principles and policies underlying strict 
products liability and more appropriate in a nonionizing radiation in-
jury case. 
iii. A combination of tests 
Finally, some jurisdictions have adopted a combination of tests in 
their attempts to find a suitable way to define a design defect.267 The 
California Supreme Court, for example, took such an approach in 
Barker v. Lull Engineering.268 In Barker, the plaintiff was injured 
while operating a high-lift loader at a construction site. An earlier 
California case269 had rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" test 
set forth in the Restatement, but had substituted no other test for 
it.270 The Barker court, therefore, proposed the following test: 
264. See Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equipment Co., 278 Or. at 397, 564 P.2d at 675·76. 
See also Keeton, supra note 242 at 568. 
265. See, e.g., Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972); Basko v. Sterling 
Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 
528 P.2d 522 (1974). 
266. See Woodill v. Parke· Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199; Keeton, supra 
note 242, at 57l. 
267. See infra cases cited at note 271. 
268. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
269. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). 
270. Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 603. 
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[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury 
that a product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves 
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably 
foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's 
design proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to 
prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the bene-
fits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design.271 
Similarly, in Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 272 the Fifth. Circuit of Ap-
peals, applying Louisiana law, stated that "[a] product is defective and 
unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell the prod-
uct if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a 
reasonable buyer would expect."27S When a court adopts a combination of 
tests, the plaintiff must deal with the problems and uncertainties of each. 
The "either/or" approach of the above tests, however, may be an advan-
tage to the nonionizing radiation plaintiff by allowing him to "choose" the 
test which is most easily satisfied by the facts of his case. 
3. The Model Uniform Products Liability Act 
Another approach to the concept of design defect is presented in 
the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (MUPLA).274 The Act, 
proposed by the Department of Commerce in 1979, was primarily 
the product of business writers and manufacturers who were greatly 
concerned that serious problems were being created, by the 
haphazard judicial development of products liability law. 276 Chief 
among these problems was a substantial increase since 1974 in the 
cost of products liability insurance.276 
The Act was offered to the states with the hope that, if adopted, it 
would assure that persons injured by unreasonably unsafe products 
would receive reasonable compensation for their injuries.277 Its spon-
sors also hoped that the Act would bring uniformity and stability to 
271. Barkerv. Lull Eng'gCo., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 573 P.2d 443, 452,143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
234 (1978) (emphasis omitted). The same approach was adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court 
in Caterpiller Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). 
272. 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff sustained serious injury when a lawnmower 
manufactured by the defendant threw a piece of wire which became embedded in the plaintiff's 
ankle). 
273. [d. at 254. 
274. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). 
275. See id. at 62,716. See also Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act - A Brief 
Overview, 33 V AND. L. REv. 579 (1980). 
276. Schwartz, B'Upra note 275, at 580. 
277. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). 
1982-83] NONIONIZING RADIATION 1003 
products liability insurance rates.278 Thus, the Act takes a more pro-
manufacturers stance than is currently taken under strict products 
liability law. This orientation is evident in the Introduction of the Act 
which states: "[t]he cost of an accident should be shifted from a 
claimant to a product seller when there is a logical and articulate ra-
tionale for deeming it (as compared with the injured individual or 
society at large) 'responsible' for the claimant's injuries."279 The Act 
stresses, further, that its basis is in tort law and that "tort law is not 
a compensation system similar to Social Security or Worker Com-
pensation."28o It does not, therefore, provide that a product seller 
will be asked to pay damages merely because its product caused in-
jury.281 
Section 104282 of the MUPLA specifically provides that a product 
manufacturer is liable if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defective product was the proximate cause of 
his harm.28B Under this scheme, a product may be proven defective 
in any of four ways. It may be either: 
1) unreasonably unsafe in construction; 
2) unreasonably unsafe in design; 
3) unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instruc-
tions were not given; or 
4) unreasonably unsafe because it did not conform to an express 
warranty.284 
Since this section has focused on design defects, the following discus-
sion will examine factor number two. 
The comment accompanying section 104285 notes the "uncertain 
strict liability principles in the area of design [defect]"286 and con-
cludes that the attempt to apply strict liability to design defect cases 
has "plunged [the courts] into a foggy area that is neither true strict 
liability nor negligence. The result has been the creation of a wide 
variety of legal 'formulae,' unpredictability for consumers and in-
stability in the insurance market."287 To correct this perceived con-
278. Id. at 62,715. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. Schwartz, supra note 275 at 584. 
282. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979). 
283. Id. at 62,721. 
284. Id. 
285. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721-26 (1979). 
286. Id. at 62,722. 
287. Id. 
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fusion, section 104 provides a balancing test for determining 
whether a product is unreasonably unsafe in design. The claimant, 
under this test, must show that the likelihood that the product would 
cause his injury or a similar injury and the seriousness of the injury 
suffered outweighs the burden on the manufacturer to design a prod-
uct that would have prevented those harms and any adverse effects 
that alternative design would have on the usefulness of the 
product.288 This determination of reasonableness in design is based 
on knowledge as it existed at the time of manufacture.289 Thus, the 
Act provides for a negligence-type balancing test which specifically 
rejects the use of judicial hindsight and relies instead on the 
weighing of factors as they existed at the time of manufacture. 290 
If the MUPLA is an indication of the future of strict liability law, it 
represents a tremendous setback for the nonionizing radiation plain-
tiff who cannot show negligence on the defendant's part. Rather 
than propose a workable rule for applying strict liability to design 
defect cases, the Act rejects strict products liability for design 
defects in favor of a fault standard291 which is significantly more dif-
ficult to satisfy. 
4. Summary of Strict Products Liability 
This section has focused on strict products liability as a means of 
recovery for nonionizing radiation plaintiffs. Strict products liability 
was developed by the courts in order to circumvent some of the prob-
lems and limitations presented by negligence and breach of warranty 
theories.292 A strict liability suit, however, presents problems of its 
own. Courts have been unable to agree on a satisfactory definition of 
design defect,29S making the field of strict products liability un-
predictable. Courts have also been reluctant to impute to manufac-
turers knowledge about the product not available at the time of 
manufacture.294 Finally, the recently proposed Uniform Products 
Liability Act rejects strict liability for design defects in favor of a 
fault or negligence standard.296 
288. [d. at 62,723. 
289. [d. 
290. See Schwartz, supra note 275 at 586. 
291. Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 642. It appears that none of the major commercial states 
have adopted MUPLA. 
292. See supra text and notes at notes 214-23. 
293. See supra text and notes at notes 240-73. 
294. See supra text and notes at notes 255-66. 
295. See supra text and notes at notes 274-90. 
1982-83] NONIONIZING RADIATION 1005 
Nevertheless, strict products liability can be a useful theory for the 
nonionizing radiation plaintiff. A faithful application of strict liability 
principles makes consideration of the foreseeability of the plaintiff's 
injury irrelevant. Thus, a manufacturer can be held liable for a defect 
that was undiscoverable at the time of manufacture. The policy con-
siderations which have made courts reluctant in the past to impute to 
manufacturers knowledge that was not available at the time of 
manufacture are not very strong in nonionizing radiation cases.296 
Therefore, plaintiffs should carefully consider the possibility of using 
a theory of strict products liability when seeking damages for non-
ionizing radiation injury. 
E. Nuisance 
The previous two sections have dealt with cases in which the plain-
tiff alleges personal injury resulting from exposure to nonionizing 
radiation either in the workplace297 or from a product which he has 
used or with which he has come in contact.298 Man-made nonionizing 
radiation sources, however, are present throughout the environ-
ment.299 Suppose, for example, that a family lives in the vicinity of a 
powerful radar installation;30o the family may allege that the threat 
to its health caused by the emission of microwave radiation from the 
radar system constitutes a substantial interference with the use and 
enjoyment of its property. For this family, the most appropriate 
theory of recovery lies in the common law of nuisance. 
1. Public and Private Nuisance 
Unfortunately, "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in 
the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' " 301 
One source of confusion is the use of the single word "nuisance" to 
describe the invasion of two very distinct interests. 302 The first is an 
interference with common public rights; the other is an invasion of 
296. See supra text and notes at notes 265, 266. 
297. See supra text and notes at notes 34-41. 
298. See supra text and notes at notes 32-52. 
299. Id. 
300. The plaintiff's attorney should be aware that if such a radar system is operated by the 
government, the plaintiff's action may be barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 131. A discussion of governmental immunity is 
beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, for purposes of this section, it will be assumed that 
the radar system is operated by a private party. 
301. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 86, at 571. 
302. Id. at 572. 
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private interests in the use and enjoyment of land. Each of these con-
cepts will now be discussed in more detail. 
a. Public nuisance 
A public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public."808 For instance, using the example of 
the radar installation in a residential area, if nonionizing radiation 
emissions from the radar system make the use of a nearby public 
beach or drinking water unsafe, the radar may constitute a public 
nuisance. The concept of public nuisanc~ in the civil common law 
grew out of early criminal prohibitions of conduct which interfered 
with the rights of the community at large.804 Just as enforcing 
criminal laws is a function of the government, redressing a public 
nuisance has traditionally been left to the state.806 Courts usually 
allow only public authorities, as representatives of the people, to 
bring suit against those creating a public nuisance. 806 
A private individual can maintain an action for public nuisance on-
ly if he has suffered harm of a different kind than that suffered by 
the general public.807 Therefore, if the only loss suffered by the fami-
ly living near the radar installation is use of the public beach, the 
family may not bring an action in public nuisance. If, however, a 
member of the family earns his living by fishing from the public 
beach, his injury could be sufficiently different in kind to afford him 
standing in a public nuisance action.808 Although the prospect of 
private citizen public nuisance actions· appears to be improving,809 
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821B(I) (1977). 
304. Id. comment (a). Examples include encroachments upon public health or the right to 
the free and safe use of the public highway. 
One article has noted that public nuisance is appropriate for challenging the invasion of the 
health, comfort, and beauty of the community. Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the 
Restatement (Secund) of Torts and Environmental Law, 2 EcoLOGY L.Q. 241, 277 (1972). 
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821C comment a (1977). 
306. See W. PRoSSER, supra note 120, S 86, at 586-87. 
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821C(1). See also Burgess v. MfV Tamano, 370 F. 
Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973). 
308. See Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. Saint Helen's, 160 Or. 654,87 
P.2d 195 (1939); Burgess v. MfV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973). But see Kuehn v. 
Milwaukee, 83 Wis. 583, 53 M.W. 912 (1892) (standing denied to fishermen who sued to enjoin 
pollution of the waters in which they fished because fishing is open to everyone). 
In some cases, the plaintiff may have an action in both public and private nuisance. This oc-
curs if the injury which gives the plaintiff standing in public nuisance also affects the use and 
enjoyment of his property. See, e.g., Awad v. McColgan, 357 Mich. 386, 98 N.W.2d 571 (1959). 
309. Bryson and Macbeth, supra note 305 at 263. See also Wade v. Campbell, 200 Cal. App. 
2d 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1962) (proximite alone to source of nuisance may constitute sufficient 
damage on which to base standing); Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Const., 174 Neb. 234, 117 
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the limitations of this theory must be recognized. These limitations 
have generally precluded such public nuisance actions brought by in-
dividuals.310 
b. Private nuisance 
Private nuisance has been defined as a nontrespassory311 invasion 
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.312 
"The ownership or rightful possession of land necessarily involves 
the right not only to the unimpaired condition of the property itself, 
but also to some reasonable comfort and convenience in its occupa-
tion."313 Thus, private nuisance actions have been brought for in-
terferences ranging from damage to the physical condition of the 
land or house thereon,314 to injury to the health or peace of mind of 
the occupants.316 In one noteworthy case, the court even allowed 
recovery for the unfounded fear of contagion from a tuberculosis 
hospital. 316 
2. Elements of Liability 
The continued use of the single word "nuisance" to describe both 
public and private nuisance has "led to the application in public 
N .W.2d 322 (1962) (injury of those living close to asphalt plant found to be different in kind as 
well as degree from that suffered by people living farther away); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS S 821C(I) (1979). 
310. If the plaintiff can overcome the standing limitations, public nuisance is an especially 
attractive nuisance theory because many of the defenses to a private nuisance action do not ap-
ply to public nuisance. See infra text and notes at notes 359-67. 
311. Trespass may also be an appropriate theory of liability for the nonionizing radiation 
plaintiff. Trespass is an interference with possessory interests in, rather than use and enjoy-
ment of, land. Trespass may be advantageous to the nonionizing radiation plaintiff for several 
reasons. First, trespass is an intentional tort. Therefore, the reasonableness of defendant's 
conduct is never an issue. Second, the plaintiff can recover in trespass without proof of actual 
damages. AB long as a disturbance of the plaintiffs exclusive possession of land is shown, 
nominal damages will be awarded. Finally, the statute of limitations for trespass is often 
longer than for nuisance. See generally, W. PROSSER, supra note 120 at 594-96. 
Traditionally trespass was confined to tangible invasions of land. In recent years, however, 
courts have been more receptive to finding a trespass even where the invading element is in-
tangible. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959) (invisible 
flouride gases and particulates from the defendant's plant settled on plaintiffs land rendering 
it unfit for livestock). 
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821D. 
313. W. PRoSSER, supra note 120, S 89, at 591. 
314. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952). 
315. Yaffe v. Fort Smith, 178 Ark. 406,10 S.W.2d 886 (1928). 
316. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47,111 P. 879 (1910). This case may be especially helpful 
for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff who fears injury from nonionizing radiation but cannot 
prove actual physical harm. The court ruled that the maintenance, in a residential district, of a 
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nuisance cases, ... of an analysis substantially similar to that 
employed for the tort action for private nuisance."317 Therefore, the 
elements of liability discussed below will, unless otherwise noted, ap-
ply to actions for both public and private nuisance. The requisite 
elements of a nuisance cause of action are: (1) a basis of liability in 
either intentional tort, negligence, or strict liability; (2) a substantial 
interference with public or private rights; and (3) an unreasonable in-
vasion of those rights. 
a. Basis of liability 
Since nuisance is a field of tort liability rather than a type of tor-
tious conduct,318 liability must be based on one of the types of con-
duct that serve in general as bases for all tort liability.319 Thus, 
liability for nuisance may rest upon an intentional invasion of the 
plaintiff's interests, a negligent invasion, or conduct which falls 
within the principle of strict liability. 320 Courts often fail to 
distinguish among these three bases of liability when dealing with 
nuisance cases.321 Nevertheless, a cause of action in nuisance will be 
successful only if it has a basis in intentional tort, negligence, or 
strict liability. 322 
i. Intentional invasion 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides two examples of an in-
tentional invasion of another's use and enjoyment of land:323 (1) an 
invasion inspired by ill will or malice;324 and (2) "an invasion that the 
actor knowingly causes in the pursuit of a laudable enterprise 
without any desire to cause harm.' '325 Under the Restatement defini-
tion, an intentional invasion exists as long as the defendant knows 
sanitarium for the treatment of tuberculosis patients is a nuisance where the fear induced by 
the proximity of the sanitarium disturbs the comfortable enjoyment of adjacent property. The 
court reached this result notwithstanding evidence that the fear was unsustained by science. 
317. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B comment e. 
318. The focus is on the interest invaded, rather than on a single type of tortious conduct. 
W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 87. 
319. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 822 comment a. 
320. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 87. 
321. [d. at 576. 
322. Note, Environmental Law-The Nuances of Nuisance in a Private Action to Control 
Air Pollution, 80 W.V. L. REV. 48,58-59 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Nuancel! of Nuisance]. 
323. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 825. 
324. [d. at comment c. 
325. [d. 
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that his conduct is causing interference with another's use and enjoy-
ment of land. The defendant need not know or intend that this inva-
sion will result in a particular type of harm.326 In the earlier 
example,327 as long as the radar operator knows that its radar 
system sends nonionizing radiation onto the family's land, there is an 
intentional invasion.328 Intentional means "not that a wrong or the 
existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator ... in-
tended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a 
nuisance."329 Thus, it is the invasion, itself, and not its result which 
must be intentional.33o 
ii. Negligent invasion 
Nuisance may also result from conduct which is negligent, that is, 
where the defendant has failed to act reasonably under the cir-· 
cumstances.331 Proving negligence may be a difficult task for the 
nonionizing radiation plaintiff. Negligence is usually determined by a 
community standard of reasonable conduct.332 Therefore, if the 
defendant has behaved as have others engaged in similar activities 
under similar circumstances, the plaintiff will be hard put to con-
vince a court that the defendant has acted unreasonably.333 On occa-
sion, however, the customs of an entire industry have been found to 
be negligent.334 This may be the best argument for the nonionizing 
radiation plaintiff in the absence of ,evidence indicating deviance 
from industry-wide custom. 
iii. Strict lialJility for abnormally dangerous activities 
Finally, a nuisance may be based on the strict liability which arises 
from abnormally dangerous activities.336 Section 520 of the Restate-
326. Melendres v. Soales, 105 Mich. App. 73, 306 N.W.2d 399 (1981). 
327. See supra text and note at note 300. 
328. See Melendres v. Soales, 105 Mich. App. 73, 306 N.W.2d 399 (1981). 
329. 105 Mich. App. at 79, 306 N.W.2d at 402 (citing Denny v. Garavaglia, 333 Mich. 317, 
331, 52 N.W.2d 521 (1952». 
330. Of course, an invasion will always be intentional if the defendant continues his conduct 
after having been informed that it is interfering with the use and enjoyment of another's prop-
erty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 comment d, illustration 4. 
331. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 87, at 575. 
332. [d. S 33, at 166. 
333. See id. 
334. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), eert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932) 
(defendant negligent for failing to install radio sets in oceangoing tugs, notwithstanding the 
fact that it had never been done in the industry before). Prosser notes that these cases will like-
ly be infrequent, however. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 33, at 167. 
335. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, 387, at 575. 
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ment (Second) of Torts provides a list of factors to be used when 
determining what constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity: 
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some 
harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) Whether the gravity of the harm which may result from it is 
likely to be great; 
(c) Whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of 
reasonable care; 
(d) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) Whether the activity is appropriate to the place where it is 
carried on; and 
(1) The value of the activity to the community.ss6 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the risks of exposure to nonion-
izing radiationss7 and the acceptance of the social utility of most ac-
tivities in which it is involved, sss it seems unlikely that a court would 
find operation of a radar system or a television station, for example, 
to be an abnormally dangerous activity. S89 Thus, in most cases, 
nuisance based on strict liability would not be an appropriate theory 
for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff to pursue. 
b. Substantial interference 
In order to prove nuisance, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant's conduct has resulted in substantial interference with the 
public or private interests involved. 840 Even if the court finds an in-
tentional invasion in a private nuisance action, it will not grant relief 
unless the plaintiff can show significant harm to his property in-
terest or to his personal comfort.841 
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 520 (1979). 
337. See supra text and notes at notes 62·67. 
338. See supra text and notes at notes 32·52. 
339. In a somewhat analogous situation, courts have generally refused to find that the 
transmission of electricity is an abnormally dangerous activity. See, e.g., Brigham v. Moon 
Lake Electric Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292,470 P.2d 393 (1970) (court refused to place strict liability 
on one who supplies electricity because our civilization could not survive without electricity, 
and those who supply it are benefactors to mankind); Bosley v. Cent. Vermont Pub. Servo 
Corp., 127 Vt. 581, 255 A.2d 671 (1969) (strict liability should be confined to things or ac· 
tivities which are extraordinary, exceptional or abnormal, but the transmission of electric cur-
rent in this day and age is a normal practice for the benefit of the community). 
340. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 87, at 577. See also Smejkal v. Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 
274 Or. 571, 547 P.2d 1363 (1976); Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake V. Davis, 420 
A.2d 53 (R.I. 1980). 
341. The nuisance must affect the comfort of the hypothetical "ordinary person." North-
west Water Corp. v. Pennetta, 29 Colo. App. 1,479 P.2d 398 (1970); Hay v. Stevens, 271 Or. 
16, 530 P.2d 37 (1975). The sensitivities of a particular plaintiff are generally not considered. 
W. PRosSER, supra note 120, S 87, at 578-79. 
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The requirement of a substantial interference may present some 
problems for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff. In private nuisance 
actions, courts most readily find a substantial interference when the 
physical condition of the plaintiff's land has been affected.342 
Physical damage to land is not likely in a nonionizing radiation case, 
however. In the alternative, the plaintiff should allege injury to per-
sonal health or well-being. 343 The substantial interference require-
ment of the private nuisance action has, in fact, been met in cases in-
volving only injury to health or peace of mind.344 Offsetting this ap-
proach is the uncertainty of the evidence on the severity of the health 
risks posed by nonionizing radiation. 346 This situation may make it 
difficult for the plaintiff to succeed in a private nuisance action with-
out some evidence of actual physical injury. 346 Complicating this 
discussion is the fact that there does not appear to be a clear dividing 
line between substantial and insubstantial injury.347 Therefore, the 
nonionizing radiation plaintiff's attorney should attempt to make the 
best possible use of the particular facts of his case and marshal the 
best possible medical and scientific evidence as well. 
c. Unreasonable invasion 
In order to prevail in a nuisance action, the plaintiff must show 
unreasonable as well as substantial invasion or harm.348 The require-
ment of an unreasonable invasion is grounded in the "obvious truth 
that each individual in a community must put up with a certain 
amount of annoyance, inconvenience and interference and must take 
a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on together."349 
The requisite unreasonableness of the harm in nuisance, however, 
342. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 87, at 578. See also Prauner v. Battle Creek Coop. 
Creamery, 173 Neb. 412, 421-22,113 N.W.2d 518,524 (1962). 
343. See, e.g., Sullivan v. American Mfg. Co., 33 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1929). 
344. See, e.g., Wilson v. Parent, 228 Or. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961) (obscene words and ges-
tures that caused emotional distress were sufficiently substantial interference to establish lia-
bility). 
345. See supra text and notes at notes 62-67. 
346. But see Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910) (substantial injury found 
where plaintiff feared disease from nearby hospital, even though fear was unfounded in scien-
tific fact). 
347. See Delight Wholesale Co. v. Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99, 453 P.2d 82 (1969) (what 
mayor may not constitute a nuisance depends upon facts and circumstances of a particular 
case). 
348. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 87, at 580-81; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 826. 
See also Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 322, at 58-59. 
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 822 comment g. 
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should be distinguished from the concept of unreasonableness found 
in the law of negligence.85o Unreasonableness in the law of nuisance 
deals with the character and extent of the plaintiffs harm in light of 
surrounding circumstances.851 This is to be distinguished from the 
determination of reasonableness in negligence law which focuses on 
the defendant's conduct.852 In a nuisance action based on negligence, 
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is, of course, of prime 
importance. Where negligence is not the basis of the plaintiff's cause 
of action, however, the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is 
not an issue. 
Courts generally determine the reasonableness of the invasion of a 
plaintiff's interests on a case-by-case basis.853 They often engage in a 
balancing process, weighing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff 
against the utility of the defendant's conduct.354 Other courts focus 
on the suitability of the surroundings for the defendant's conduct.355 
In general, courts seek to strike a balance between each party's 
freedom to use and enjoy its land and the annoyances and inconven-
iences which go along with modern life, often valued on an economic 
basis. 
As long as the risk of exposure to nonionizing radiation remains 
uncertain,356 it will be difficult for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff 
to meet the unreasonable invasion requirement of the nuisance ac-
tion, especially if actual physical harm has not yet appeared. This is 
particularly true in a jurisdiction which balances the gravity of harm 
to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant's conduct. The 
gravity of harm to the nonionizing radiation plaintiff may be unclear 
or unascertainable altogether, especially where the plaintiff con-
tends that defendant's conduct presents a threat of future harm.367 
The utility of the defendant's conduct, on the other hand, is obvious 
350. See Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 322, at 59-60. 
351. See id. 
352. See id. 
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) comment e. 
354. See, e.g., Pitsenbarger v. No. Natural Gas Co., 198 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Iowa 1961); 
Weber v. Pieretti, 72 N.J. Super. 184, 178 A.2d 92 (1962); Gronn v. Rogers Const., 221 Or. 
226,350 P.2d 1086 (1960). But see Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164,177,172 
N.W.2d 647,654 (1969) (the court upheld the exclusion of evidence tending to show the utility 
of the defendant's conduct, commenting: "We conclude that injuries caused by air pollution or 
other nuisance must be compensated irrespective of the utility of the offending conduct as 
compared to the injury"). 
355. See, e.g., Oak Haven Trailer Ct. v. Western Wayne Co. Conservation Ass'n, 3 Mich. 
App. 83, 89, 141 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1966). 
356. See supra text and notes at notes 62-67. 
357. See Note, Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REV. 675, 
690 (1981). 
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when that conduct is involved with national defense, the national 
communications system, or even ordinary manufacturing and com-
merce. The problems may not be as great in a jurisdiction which 
focuses on the suitability of the surroundings for defendant's con-
duct. There, the operation of a radar installation in the midst of a 
dense residential area is likely to be viewed as inappropriate, thus 
subjecting the operator to greater susceptibility to nuisance claims. 
Even here, however, the court would probably not find an 
unreasonable invasion without conclusive evidence of a threat of 
harm. Once again, the determination of unreasonable invasion is 
usually done on a case-by-case basis.s58 Therefore, the plaintiff's at-
torney should emphasize the growing evidence of danger presented 
by exposure to nonionizing radiation in order to satisfy the 
unreasonable invasion requirement. 
3. Defenses 
In order to fully prepare the action in nuisance, the nonionizing 
radiation plaintiff must be aware of the defenses which may be used 
against him. The availability of these defenses sometimes depends 
upon the basis of the nuisance action. For example, where the 
nuisance action is based on the defendant's negligent conduct, there 
may be an allegation of contributory negligence if the plaintiff 
himself has failed to act reasonably. 359 
Assumption of the risk is a defense which may be interposed 
regardless of the basis of the nuisance action. S60 Where the plaintiff 
occupied his property before the existence of the nuisance, this 
defense operates only so far as it requires the plaintiff to take 
reasonable action to avoid harm under the circumstances.361 He need 
not move away or surrender valuable property uses because of the 
defendant's activities. 362 Where the plaintiff has come to the 
nuisance by moving next to one already existing, the imposition of 
assumption of the risk as a defense seems to be in order. 363 
In fact, although some courts have allowed coming to the nuisance 
as an absolute defense to an action in nuisance, S64 the prevailing rule 
358. See supra text and note at note 353. 
359. Runnells v. Maine Cent. RR, 159 Me. 200, 190 A.2d 739 (1963). 
For a complete discussion of contributory negligence see W. PROSSER. supra note 120, S 65. 
360. Assumption of risk is an appropriate defense when the plaintiff has knowingly en-




364. See, e.g., Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158 
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seems to be that coming to the nuisance does not bar a nuisance ac-
tion.365 Thus, it appears that assumption of the risk will not generally 
bar the nonionizing radiation plaintiff's nuisance action, even if he 
has moved next to an already existing nonionizing radiation source. 
Further, the scientific uncertainty with respect to nonionizing radia-
tion would seem to operate in favor of the plaintiff, who could not be 
expected to know more than experts in the field. 
Finally, a defendant who is acting in compliance with legislative 
authority-zoning, for example-might argue that this authority 
makes his action, not an actionable nuisance per se.366 If, however, 
the plaintiff can prove substantial and unreasonable interference, 
courts usually hold that compliance with a regulation is not a defense 
to a nuisance.367 Thus, even the defendant's compliance with all 
regulations pertaining to the operation of his radar station will not, 
in most cases, be a bar to the plaintiff's nuisance action. 
4. Remedies 
If the plaintiff is able to establish the existence of a nuisance, he 
may seek damages, an injunction, or both.368 A damages remedy 
may include compensation for both past and future injuries.369 The 
elements of damages in a nuisance action include loss of the value at-
tached to the use and enjoyment of the property and any personal in-
jury sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the nuisance.37o 
In order to obtain an injunction the plaintiff must show that money 
damages will not be an adequate remedy.371 Injunctive relief may 
also be granted upon a showing of the threat of harm which has not 
(1957). 
365. See, e.g., Mahone v. Autry, 55 N.M. 111, 227 P.2d 623 (1951). Prosser notes that "com-
ing to the nuisance" is "merely one factor, although clearly not the most important one, to be 
weighed in the scale along with the other elements which bear upon the question of 'reasonable 
use.' " W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 91, at 611. 
366. See id. at 606-07. 
367. Venuto v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116,99 Gal. Rptr. 350 
(1971). Neither is it a defense to show that a nuisance-causing instrumentality is built in accord 
with the latest approved methods or that it is operated skillfully. Clause v. Weaver Const. Co., 
158 N.W.2d 139, 261 Iowa 225 (1968). 
368. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 90. Prosser also notes that abatement of a nuisance by 
self-help is also an option. Id. at 605-606. 
369. Past and future damages will generally be awarded where the court determines that 
the nuisance is permanent in nature. See Spaulding v. Cameron, 38{;al. 2d 265,239 P.2d 625 
(1952); Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 322, at 68. 
370. For a more detailed discussion of the damage remedy in a nuisance action see W. PROS. 
SER, supra note 120, S 90; Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 322, at 67-69. 
371. As has been noted: 
Damages ... will often be deemed inadequate where: (1) the injury suffered cannot 
be accurately calculated in terms of dollars; (2) the injury to the plaintiff is ir-
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yet occurred.372 This is an advantage for the plaintiff who has not yet 
suffered personal injury from exposure to nonionizing radiation, but 
who fears that such injury will occur in the future. 
In deciding whether to issue an injunction, courts usually perform 
a balancing of the equities.373 In this balancing, the court weighs the 
harm to the plaintiff if the activity were to continue against the harm 
to the defendant if he were to be forced to stop.374 This balancing 
may work against the nonionizing radiation plaintiff because the dif-
ficulty in placing a value on his injuries may make proof of the plain-
tiff's harm uncertain.375 Further, before granting an injunction, 
courts require that the plaintiff prove that the anticipated harm is 
virtually certain to occur, that is, that the harm is "imminent and ir-
reparable."376 The present inconclusiveness of scientific evidence 
regarding the effect of nonionizing radiation on humans377 may pre-
vent such a showing. Furthermore, courts have recently exhibited 
some hesitation to issue injunctions where there is any possibility 
that damages will compensate the plaintiff for present and future in-
juries.378 Thus, it appears that the nonionizing radiation plaintiff 
who seeks an injunction faces a difficult task. 
If the plaintiff can surmount these obstacles to recovery, however, 
nuisance may be a very useful theory on which to base liability for 
nonionizing radiation injury. By its nature, nuisance can provide a 
remedy for a large number of plaintiffs suffering from a variety of 
injuries.379 A nuisance action based on intentional tort relieves the 
plaintiff of the burden of proving negligence. This is especially ad-
vantageous where the defendant has consistently followed industry 
safeguards and customs which, nevertheless, have resulted in the 
plaintiff's injury. Finally, the availability of equitable relief affords 
reparable; (3) the injury is continuous in nature; or (4) the usefulness of the plaintiffs 
land is seriously impaired. 
Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 322 at 71 (footnotes omitted). 
372. W. PROSSER, supra note 120, S 90, at 603. See also Monsanto Chern. Co. v. Fincher, 272 
Ala. 534, 133 So. 2d 192 (1961). 
373. Updating the Injunction, supra note 161, at 142. 
374. Id. 
375. Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories 
to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1104 (1970). 
376. Updating the Injunction, supra note 161, at 123. See also Falkner v. Brookfield, 368 
Mich. 17, 117 N.W. 2d 125 (1962); Marshall v. Consumer Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 
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the plaintiff a potential remedy for the threat of future harm from an 
existing nuisance. 
In summary, this section has focused on the appropriateness of ac-
tions based on the common law of nuisance in cases involving non-
ionizing radiation injury. As with the other theories examined, the 
plaintiff faces several difficulties. In a public nuisance action, the 
plaintiff must show special damage in order to sue as a private 
citizen. Under both public and private nuisance theories, there will 
be difficulties proving a basis of liability, substantial interference, 
and unreasonableness of the invasion. Even if the plaintiff suc-
cessfully overcomes his opponent's defenses and prevails on the 
nuisance claim, he may face difficulties obtaining an appropriate 
remedy if personal injury has not yet occurred or if the risk of future 
harm cannot be proven with sufficient certainty to warrant an in-
junction. Despite these obstacles, however, the common law of 
nuisance can be a useful tool for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff. 
Under a nuisance theory, the plaintiff can seek relief for both per-
sonal injury and property damage. Nuisance also affords the flexibili-
ty of equitable relief. Therefore, the plaintiff's attorney should ex-
plore the common law of nuisance in preparing a nonionizing radia-
tion injury claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
American industry and military research have developed a large 
number of devices in the past forty years which emit nonionizing 
radiation. As a result, millions of Americans are exposed to poten-
tially hazardous nonionizing radiation at work and at home. Nonion-
izing radiation technology has developed with little federal, state, or 
local control. 880 As a result, there is little regulatory protection for 
people who are exposed to nonionizing radiation, and no comprehen-
sive statutory scheme covers those who have been injured by it.881 
Thus, victims of nonionizing radiation injury must resort to existing 
statutory and common law theories of recovery. 
Existing theories of liability present a number of problems for the 
nonionizing radiation plaintiff. Virtually all nonionizing radiation 
plaintiffs will encounter a short statute of limitations.882 This is a 
problem when the plaintiff's injury has not manifested itself until 
long after exposure to nonionizing radiation has ended. In addition, 
380. See supra Section II.D. 
381. Id. 
382. See supra text and notes at Section lILA., notes 101-18. 
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all nonionizing radiation plaintiffs must prove that exposure to the 
radiation caused their injuries.888 The uncertainty of the scientific 
evidence of the biological effects of nonionizing radiation and the 
nature of the injury itself make proof of causation difficult.884 These 
are merely the threshold problems faced by nearly all nonionizing 
radiation plaintiffs. Additional problems arise when employing ex-
isting theories of recovery in nonionizing radiation injury cases. 
Workers' compensation statutes represent one possible theory of 
recovery. They were specifically enacted to provide benefits for 
workers injured on the job. 885 Many states, however, require that the 
injury be the result of an "accident," or fit within a narrow statutory 
definition of "occupational disease. "886 These limitations may 
preclude the nonionizing radiation plaintiff from recovery. 
Plaintiffs injured by consumer products which emit nonionizing 
radiation may proceed under products liability theories. Under strict 
products liability, the plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by 
defective consumer products without proof of manufacturer's 
fault. 387 Proof of design defect, however, may be difficult because 
considerable confusion surrounds the present legal definition of 
design defect.388 Furthermore, the Model Uniform Products Liabili-
ty Act removes design defect cases from the field of strict products 
liability.889 Thus, the plaintiff proceeding under a strict products 
liability theory faces many problems. 
The common law of nuisance has received renewed attention in re-
cent years as a means of recovery for interference with use and en-
joyment of property. Inconclusive scientific evidence, however, 
makes it very difficult for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff to prove 
the requisite substantial interference.89o It may also be difficult to 
show that the invasion of the plaintiff's rights is unreasonable.391 
Finally, the nonionizing radiation plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief 
must prevail in a balancing process which is often by nature 
weighted against him.892 
Despite these problems, recovery for nonionizing radiation injury 
383. See supra text and notes at Section III.B., notes 119-69. 
384. See supra text and notes at notes 125-63. 
385. See supra text and notes at notes 176-79. 
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is not impossible. The severity of the problems facing the plaintiff, 
however, will depend greatly on the future direction of the courts 
and on the creativity of lawyers. Because liability for nonionizing 
radiation injury is an evolving area of law, the plaintiff's attorney 
will play an important role in determining its direction. Therefore, in 
preparing the nonionizing radiation injury claim, the plaintiff's at-
torney must be creative and should not quickly discard any potential 
theory of recovery. 
The nonionizing radiation plaintiff's attorney must argue that the 
discovery rule should apply in determining when a statute of limita-
tions begins to run.393 Courts must also be reminded of the dif-
ference between medical and legal definitions of causation.394 If the 
nonionizing radiation plaintiff proceeds under a workers' compensa-
tion statute, his attorney must convince the court to take whatever 
interpretive steps are possible to insure that worker's compensation 
statutes provide benefits for any disease or injury which arises out of 
employment.39s In a strict products liability case, the plaintiff's at-
torney must advocate a definition of design defect which juries can 
apply and which remains faithful to the principles and policies of 
strict liability. 396 Finally, a nuisance action may present the greatest 
number of problems for the nonionizing radiation plaintiff.397 
Because of the potential scope and flexibility of the remedy in a 
nuisance action, however, the plaintiff's attorney should make the 
best use of all available evidence to convince the court that nonioniz-
ing radiation presents a substantial and unreasonable interference 
with the plaintiff's rights.39s 
Due to the problems inherent in existing theories, the best protec-
tion for those who are exposed to nonionizing radiation is through a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.399 The development of such a 
scheme, however, is time consuming. In light of the present trend 
away from government regulation,400 regulatory solution may be an 
unreasonable expectation. Thus, the plaintiff's attorney, through 
creative use of existing remedies, will play a significant role in the 
future development of nonionizing radiation liability law. 
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